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Justice, which is the end of law, is the ideal compromise between the
activities of each and the activities of all in a crowded world. The law seeks
to harmonize these activities and to adjust the relations of every man with his
fellows so as to accord with the moral sense of the community. When the
community is at one in its ideas of justice, this is possible. When the
community is divided and diversified, and groups and classes and interests,
understanding each other none too well, have conflicting ideas ofjusticd, the
task is extremely difficult.
Roscoe Pound'
INTRODUCTION
Mediation, an ancient,2 private, non-legal dispute resolution process,
has recently found a welcome reception in the civil justice system.3 Within
1. Roscoe Pound, Address Before the American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 29,
1906), in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE app. at 337, 340 (A.
Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979) [hereinafter POUND CONFERENCE].
2. For examples of ancient mediation systems, see JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION
1-2 (1984) (China and Japan); P.H. GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS: A CROSS-CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVE 25-26 (1979) (African moots); Jerome A. Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of
Modernization, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1205 (1966). Biblical references to mediative conflict resolution
are found in St. Paul's admonition to the people of Corinth. I Corinthians 6:1-4.
3. SeegenerallyNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON COURT-CONNECTEDDISPUTE RESOLUTION RESEARCH
(Susan Keilitz ed., 1994) [hereinafter NATIONAL SYMPOSIuM].
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the last fifteen years, in both state and federal courts, litigants have often
been required to attend a mediation session before they will be allowed to
be heard by a judge.
The trend toward court mediation5 is remarkable because our civil
justice system has traditionally promised justice6 through law.7 The
promise of mediation is different: Justice is derived, not through the
operation of law, but through autonomy and self-determination.' When
mediation occurs in court, significant policy questions arise: What happens
to law? To justice? Do they collapse in the experience of self-determina-
tion? If so, what then happens to the promise of justice through law,
4. ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & MARGARET SHAW, CENTER FOR PUB. RESOURCES LEGAL PROGRAM,
COURT ADR: ELEMENTS OF PROGRAM DESIGN 1 (1992). See generally CENTER FOR PUB. RESOURCES
LEGAL PROGRAM, ADR & COURTS: A MANUAL FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS (Erika S. Fine & Elizabeth
S. Plapinger eds., 1987) (including descriptions of selected mediation rules and programs in federal
district courts).
Oddly enough, commentators still refer to mediation as an "alternative" to the overcrowded courts,
or as an "alternative" way to obtain justice for those who cannot afford the courts. See, e.g., James
Podgers, Chasing the Ideal, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994, at 56, 60.
5. Throughout this article, the term "court mediation" refers to mediation which occurs under the
auspices of the court system. This is variously labeled in specific state and federal court programs as
court-connected, court-annexed, court-ordered, and court-referred mediation.
6. Volumes have been written on the meaning of "justice." In this article, "justice" means
fairness, giving to each his or her due. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 136-79 (F.H. Peters
trans., 2d ed. 1884) (discussing justice and injustice, and the types of acts with which they are
concerned). See also HANS KELSEN, WHAT IS JUSTICE?: JUSTICE, LAW, AND POLITICS IN THE MIRROR
OF SCIENCE 125-36 (1957).
"Justice through law," the type of justice which litigants expect to receive in the court system, has
both procedural and substantive components. Procedurally, it means a fair process-the opportunity to
be heard; substantively, it is based on the application of objective legal norms. In this regard, I refer
to David Luban's concept of"legal" justice or "justice within the system" and his differentiation of this
from "revisionary" justice:
The former treats the social world we live in and the constraints it imposes as given, seeking
justice within the terms defined by that social world and those constraints. Revisionary justice
measures justice according to a more detached or even utopian standard, abstracts from
constraints imposed by the system as it is currently constituted, and subjects the social world
in which we live to assessment and criticism.
David Luban, The Quality of Justice, 66 DENy. U. L. REV. 381, 384 (1989).
7. I refer here to positive law and the rules and norms of practice which govern the legal system.
See Margaret J. Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REv. 781, 782 (1989).
8. The Standards of Conduct for mediators, developed by the American Arbitration Association
(AAA), the American Bar Association (ABA), and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution
(SPIDR), state that "[s]elf-determination is the fundamental principle of mediation." STANDARDS OF
CONDUCT (1994), reprinted in KimBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE app.
c, at 268 (1994) [hereinafter STANDARDS OF CONDUCT].
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particularly where one or both of the parties are not represented by
lawyers?9 These are the questions I address in this article.
My inquiry focuses specifically on the role of law in mediation-how it
affects the process, the outcome and, ultimately, the type of justice that
parties achieve in court mediation. This subject has been widely noticed,
but largely unexamined."0 To date, the debate has suffered from lack of
empirical understanding about how law is included or excluded in the
mediation process." Critics recoil from mediation due to the absence of
law in the process while proponents applaud mediation's freedom from
law's grasp. In this article, I question the premise of both assumptions
when mediation occurs in the court system. Relying on case studies from
a small claims court mediation clinic 2 and other empirical research, I
demonstrate that law neither automatically appears nor disappears in court
mediation. The law's influence in the mediation process depends in large
measure upon the individual mediator's approach to the mediation
process. 3 This unpredictable character affects the kind and quality of
justice currently available in court mediation. 4
9. My particular concern throughout this article is with court mediation programs in the informal
courts where parties generally participate without attorneys. Informal courts include a broad array of
fora, including small claims courts, magistrate courts, and justice of the peace courts, where monetary
awards are generally the sole relief available, the dollar jurisdictional amount is limited, and litigants
often appear without lawyers.
To the extent that these courts dispense with formal rules of procedure and rigid application of
formal law, they may be considered part of a wider system of "informal" justice, which includes local
community dispute centers, victim services organizations, and other entities that offer mediation services
on a walk-in basis.
10. Some earlier commentators assumed that law, like adjudication, operated totally outside the
mediation process. See, e.g., CATHIE J. WrrrY, MEDIATION AND SOCIETY: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
IN LEBANON x (1980) ("Analysis of mediation as an integral and necessary component of a dispute
settlement system also specifically and directly questions the role of law and adjudication in American
Society.").
11. This theory-practice gap is understandable in view of mediation's recent popular appeal.
12. I am the director of the Fordham Law School Mediation Clinic, which operates in the New
York City small claims courts of Manhattan, Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens. Much of my thinking in
this area derives from my own and my students' mediation experiences in these courts over the last
eight years.
13. I am referring here to cases where questions of law are involved.
14. It also raises a question about the circumstances under which court mediation agreements
comport with general notions ofjustice. The same issue has been raised with respect to a wide variety
of settlements. E.g., HAZEL GENN, HARD BARGAINING: OUT OF COURT SETTLEMENT IN PERSONAL
INJURY ACTIONS 2 (1987); Roger C. Cramton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and "Settlement Class
Actions". An Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811 (1995); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting Wile The
Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995).
The question ofjustice in mediation is discussed more fully in Part IV; see infra notes 174-241 and
COURT MEDIATION
Analysis of the mediation case studies suggests that, to the extent law is
a relevant concern in court mediation, at least two fundamental policy
questions must be addressed: What are the limits of self-determination?
And, when does self-determination trump the protections of law? In
exploring the role of law in these cases and how it affects the kind of
justice achieved in court mediation, a tale of three kinds of justice emerges:
justice through law based on objective legal norms, which parties typically
expect to receive when they bring their disputes to court in the first
instance; "individualized" justice based on subjective standards, which court
mediation programs purport to deliver; and finally, hit-or-miss justice,
which is what often actually results under current court mediation regimes.
In my view, we should expect more. When the legal institutions of our
court system require or strongly encourage mediation, the values of the
legal system come into play and must be served. Thus, I urge an under-
standing of justice in court mediation which focuses on whether parties
achieve the counterpart to justice through law, what I call "equivalency"
justice." I do not equate "equivalency justice" with the likely court
outcome, but rather with its capacity for responding to the parties'
reasonable expectations for a fair result when they first come to court.
Parties choose the legal system to resolve disputes primarily because they
want what courts have to offer, namely, a resolution of their disputes based
on principles of law.' 6 When parties are required to resolve disputes
differently, through the mediation process, their bargaining should be
informed by knowledge of law. Thus, how legal rights 7 are acknowledged
or ignored determines in large measure whether parties achieve "equivalen-
cy" justice in court mediation.
Part I of this article traces the development of court mediation over the
past twenty years. Part II begins to explore the normative question of what
role law should play in court mediation and presents two case studies from
a court mediation project. These studies provide the framework for
discussion in the remainder of the article. Part III considers the predominant
positions concerning the relationship between law and mediation;
accompanying text.
15. This "equivalency justice" has both procedural and substantive components. See infra notes
201-16 and accompanying text.
16. Of course, parties may also choose the court system because they are unaware of alternatives
to court adjudication of disputes or simply because they wish to harass their opponents through legal
means. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
17. In this article, "legal rights" refers to entitlements provided by law.
1996]
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particularly, criticism that law is excluded from the mediation process. Part
III also discusses the merits of including law in the mediation process. Part
IV calls for greater understanding of the meaning of justice in court media-
tion.
I. COURT MEDIATION
The traditional promise of the court system is to provide litigants with
justice through law.'8 This promised goal may not always be achieved, 9
but at least it is the normative ideal. With the growing popularity of the
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement, courts have shown
increased interest in mediation's potential as an official settlement process.
As mediation programs are institutionalized in court, litigants find
themselves directed off their original course of seeking justice through
law.20 In a very real sense, their original expectations for a process and an
outcome based on legal procedures and principles are suspended in court
mediation.2'
4. The Mediation Process
As a starting point, I offer an operational definition of mediation which
encompasses its traditional understanding as an informal, consensual
process in which a neutral22 third party, without power to impose a settle-
18. This is not to suggest, however, that law and justice are synonymous. Cf. Andrew W.
McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660, 1664-65 (1985) (arguing that
law and justice are not synonymous).
19. See generally Jeffrey M. Blum, Critical Legal Studies and the Rule ofLaw, 38 BUFF. L. REV.
59 (1990); Radio, supra note 7.
20. See James Alfini et al., What Happens When Mediation is Institutionalized?: To the Parties,
Practitioners, and Host Institutions, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RFSOL. 307 (1994).
21. Generally, if parties fail to resolve their disputes in court mediation, they have the right to
return to court for a trial before a judge.
22. There are a number of differing views on the meaning of neutrality and its value in mediation.
See Sara Cobb & Janet Rifkin, Neutrality As a Discursive Practice: The Construction and
Transformation of Narratives in Community Mediation, in 11 STUD. L., POL. & Soc'y 69, 70 (Austin
Sarat & Susan S. Silbey eds., 1991); Sara Cobb & Janet Rifkin, Practice and Paradox: Deconstructing
Neutrality in Mediation, 16 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 35 (1991); Isabelle R. Gunning, Diversity Issues in
Mediation: Controlling Negative Cultural Myths, 1995 J. DisP. RESOL. 55; Joseph B. Stulberg, The
Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind, 6 VT. L. REV. 85, 96 (1981);
Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1, 8
(1981).
Research has shown that in some areas, such as child custody, mediators are not neutral and this
affects the outcome. See, e.g., Cheryl Regehr, The Use of Empowerment in Child Custody Mediation:
A Feminist Critique, 11 MEDIATION Q. 361,362 (1994) (citing studies which show mediator preference
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ment, "assists disputing parties in reaching a mutually satisfactory
resolution."23 Lon Fuller's classic formulation reminds us of mediation's
"capacity to reorient the parties toward each other, not by imposing rules
on them, but by helping them to achieve a new and shared perception of
their relationship, a perception that will redirect their attitudes and
dispositions toward one another."'24
There are, today, a number of differing views about the mediation
process, and this, in turn, has generated a variety of opinions about the
appropriate role of the mediator.2 The label "mediation" is attached to a
wide variety of practices ranging from court conferences strongly
suggesting settlement" to exercises in moral development.27 At one end
for shared parenting and joint custody and how these values affect decisions made by couples).
23. KOVACH, supra note 8, at 16-18. Mediation is defined differently in a number of texts and
articles. See, e.g., FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 7 (defining mediation as the process by which
the participants and a neutral person "isolate disputed issues in order to develop options, consider
alternatives, and reach a consensual settlement"); CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS:
PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 14 (1986) (defining mediation as the intervention
into a dispute by a neutral third party to assist disputing parties in reaching an acceptable settlement);
Leonard L. Riskin, The Special Place of Mediation in Alternative Dispute Processing, 37 U. FLA. L.
REV. 19, 24 (1985) (defining mediation as "a voluntary process in which a neutral third party, who
lacks authority to impose a solution, helps participants reach their own agreement").
The problem of defining mediation is connected to its contextual nature. With the increased use of
mediation in a wide variety of settings, new practice models are continually emerging. E.g., JAMES C.
FREUND, THE NEUTRAL NEGOTIATOR: WHY AND HOW MEDIATION CAN WORK TO RESOLVE DOLLAR
DISPUTES (1994); JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, PREPARING FOR PEACE: CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION ACROSS
CULTURES (1995); WHEN TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS (Deborah M. Kolb et al. eds., 1994)
[hereinafter WHEN TALK WORKS].
24. Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 325 (1971).
25. E.g., compare James B. Boskey, The Proper Role of the Mediator: Rational Assessment, Not
Pressure, 10 NEGOTIATION J. 367, 372 (1994) (arguing that the proper role of mediators is to attempt
to gain agreement between parties) with ROBERT A.B. BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF
MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 12 (1994)
(arguing that the proper role of mediators is to empower parties and help them grow morally). For a
discussion of the mediator's role with unrepresented parties in court mediation, see infra notes 217-37
and accompanying text.
26. A description of a recent mediation session in small claims court is illustrative:
They were sitting elbow to elbow in Manhattan Small Claims Court but they were miles
apart .... "Enough!" said Kevin McClanahan, the mediator presiding over the case, who
wanted the litigants to split the difference and forgo a trial.... Glaring at the condo owner,
Mr. McClanahan assured him that he had the right to a trial but also offered a warning.
"Maybe the judge will get to your case that first night or maybe she won't. So you'll return
and wait another four or five hours. Even then she might not get to you, so you'll come back
again. After all that, you might lose."
A woman sitting beside the condo owner murmured to him, "Even if you win, she can
appeal and you'll have to come back again."
"O.K., O,K.," he finally conceded. "I'll give her the $900."
J. Peder Zane, Tell It to the Judge... but Only If You Feel You Really Must: In Small Claims Courts,
54 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 74:47
of the spectrum is the instrumentalist vision of mediation as an efficient
means of managing court calendars-a perfunctory process which settles
cases and clears dockets.28 At the other extreme is a more noble vision of
mediation as a process of moral development which helps individuals
realize their ends and develop a stronger sense of efficaciousness.29
Somewhere in between is the ethical pragmatists' view that mediation is a
good method of resolving some disputes when it is responsive to human
needs.30
Depending upon one's philosophy of mediation, the cardinal virtues of
this process can be self-determination, 31 autonomy, 32  empowerment,
transformation, and efficiency.33 Mediation is thought to enhance parties'
a Move to Peacemaking, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1995, § 3, at 8.
27. See, e.g., John Lande, Mediation Paradigms and Professional Identities, MEDIATION Q., June
1984, at 19 (describing mediation as "an expression of a set of positive values about how people should
deal with one another").
28. See, e.g., Morris L. Medley & James A. Schellenberg, Attitudes of Indiana Judges Toward
Mediation, 11 MEDIATION Q. 329, 334 (1994).
29. This is what Bush and Folger call the "transformative approach." BUSH & FOLGER, supra note
25, at 12; see also Frank Dukes, Public Conflict Resolution: A Transformative Approach, 9
NEGOTIATION J. 45, 47 (1993).
30. I count myself among this group. See, e.g., Sally E. Merry, Albie M. Davis: Community
Mediation as Community Organizing, in WHEN TALK WORKS, supra note 23, at 245; Albic M. Davis,
The Logic Behind the Magic of Mediation, 5 NEGOTIATION J. 17, 23 (1989) (stating that mediation is
"designed to go with, not against, the grain of humanity'); cf Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing
Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of innovation Co-Opted or "The Law of ADR,'" 19 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1991) (stating that alternative forms of dispute resolution, unlike adjudication,
may help solve many human problems); Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J.
29, 58 (1982) (stating that mediation "highlights the interconnectedness of human beings").
31. Mediator standards of conduct, developed jointly by the AAA, ABA, and SPIDR, hold that
self-determination is the central principle of mediation. See supra note 8.
32. In the context of mediation practice, "autonomy" has been defined as that which exists "when
an individual has the capacity to make a choice among real alternatives, and can make that choice using
reasons with which he or she is comfortable." David E. Matz, Mediator Pressure and Party Autonomy:
Are They Consistent with Each Other?, 10 NEGOTIATION J. 359, 360 (1994).
33. Commentators have articulated various core values of mediation. See, e.g., BUSH & FOLOER,
supra note 25, at 31-32 ("transformation of human moral awareness and conduct"); Beryl Blaustone,
The Conflicts of Diversity, Justice, and Peace in the Theories of Dispute Resolution; A Myth: Bridge
Makers Who Face the Great Mystery, 25 U. TOL. L. REv. 253, 258 (1994) (arguing that there are four
core values that underlie mediation: "First, mediation should promote the self-actualization or self-
determination of the individual. Second, the individual should take ownership or responsibility for her
own actions.... Third, the individual has the responsibility to understand the experience of the others
in the dispute. Fourth, the individual has the responsibility to act in ways which acknowledge the
previous understanding."); Robert A.B. Bush, Efficiency and Protection, or Empowerment and
Recognition?: The Mediator's Role and Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REV. 253, 267-70
(1989) (empowerment and recognition); Carrie Menkel-Medow, The Many Ways of Mediation: The
Transformation of Traditions, Ideologies, Paradigms, and Practices, 11 NEG. J. 217, 240 (1995) (book
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self-determinative capabilities because it permits them to structure and
consent to the outcome of the bargaining process. 34 Unlike decision
making by a neutral third party in the adjudication process, decision
making in mediation rests solely with the disputing parties. Some
commentators consider mediation to be a fairer process than adjudication
because the affected parties have complete authority in selecting what
values will govern the resolution of their dispute.35 Finally, mediation is
thought to result in greater litigant satisfaction than does judicial adjudica-
tion of disputes.36 There has been a significant amount of scholarly
activity directed toward testing and validating these assumptions.37
review) (arguing that "mediation is transformative because it is educational").
34. The empowerment value of mediation has also been recognized in the context of client
decision making. See Mary M. Zulack, Rediscovering Client Decisionmaking: The Impact of Role-
Playing, 3 CLINICAL L. REV. 593, 613 (1995):
35. See Riskin, supra note 30, at 34. Riskin argues that fairness is the "ultimate issue in
mediation." Leonard L. Riskin, Toward New Standards for the Neutral Lawyer in Mediation, 26 AIZ.
L. REV. 329, 349 (1984). For empirical studies on perceptions of fairness in mediation, see MICHELE
HERMANN ET AL., THE METROCOURT PROJECT FINAL REPORT 105 (1993) (reporting that both mediation
respondents and claimants perceived the outcomes as being more fair and less biased than adjudication);
Susan Keilitz, Civil Dispute Resolution Processes, in NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3, at 9
(reporting that 75% of litigants and attorneys perceived mediation to be fair according to a study of
Hennepin County, Minnesota); Janice A. Roehl & Royer F. Cook, Mediation in InterpersonalDisputes:
Effectiveness and Limitations, in MEDIATION RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD-
PARTY INTERVENTION 31, 33 (Kenneth Kressel & Dean G. Pruitt eds., 1989) [hereinafter MEDIATION
RESEARCH] (reporting that disputants typically perceived outcomes of mediation to be "significantly
fairer" than those of court proceedings).
36. For studies showing litigant satisfaction with mediation, see HERMANN ET AL., supra note 35,
at 116 (noting that minority claimants and respondents reported higher satisfaction with mediation than
with adjudication despite the fact hat they fared less well monetarily in mediation); John A. Goerdt,
How Mediation Is Working in Small Claims Courts, JUDGES' J., Fall 1993, at 12, 49 (reporting that 77%
and 79% of users were satisfied with outcomes and procedures, respectively, in mediation); Joan B.
Kelly & Mary A. Duryee, Women's and Men's Views of Mediation in Voluntary and Mandatory
Mediation Settings, 30 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTs, REV. 34, 43-44 (1992) (reporting user satisfaction
rates ranging from 41% to 78% in two California studies); Jessica A. Pearson, Family Mediation, in
NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3, at 63 (noting that user satisfaction rates in family mediation cases
fall in the 70% to 90% range); Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation: An Overview
of Research Results, 19 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 451,463-65 (1985) (observing that mediation users
are extremely pleased with the process whether or not they reach an agreement). See also Craig A.
McEwen & Thomas W. Milburn, Explaining a Paradox of Mediation, 9 NEGOTIATION J. 23, 23 (1993)
("[R]eluctant parties often use mediation effectively and evaluate their mediation experiences
positively."). But see Wendy Clark, One Consumer's View ofADR, NIDR FORUM, Summer/Fall 1993,
at 14 (discussing dissatisfaction with mediation in a landlord-tenant dispute).
37. On compliance with mediation agreements, compare Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman,
Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 L. & SOC'Y REV. 11,
20-22 (1984) (noting a "strikingly high level of full compliance") with Neil Vidmar, The Small Claims
Court: A Reconceptualization of Disputes and an Empirical Investigation, 18 L. & Soc'Y REv. 515,
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B. The Role of Law in Mediation
Conventional wisdom concerning mediation holds that substantive law
is not dispositive in the mediation process 3 -- it operates simply as a
template to show what might be available in a more formal, legalistic
setting.39 Instead of law, free-standing normative standards govern in
mediation, and parties actually affected by a dispute decide what factors
should influence the efforts to resolve that dispute.4" Thus, the moral
reference point in mediation is the self,4" and individualized notions of
fairness, justice, morality, ethics, and culture may trump the values
associated with any objective framework provided by law.
Some scholars have argued that because mediation operates outside the
supposed protection of law and the legal process, it has potential to do the
most good.42 Disputing parties have the ability to resolve their problems
in a wider framework than the limited confines of the legal system.
Mediation does not silence the parties in ways that law does with rules of
evidence, procedure, and the like.43 Rather, it engages them in a valuable
542-45 (1984) (concluding that "[m]uch more research on the problem of compliance is needed").
38. See Gary Friedman, Mediation: Reducing Dependence on Lawyers and Courts to Achieve
Justice, in THE PEOPLE'S LAW REVIEW 42 (Ralph Warner ed., 1980); CENTER FOR LAW AND HUMAN
VALUES, BEYOND THE ADVERSARY MODEL, MATERIALS ON MEDIATION AND ALTERNATIVE
APPROACHES TO LAW PRACTICE, VOL. II, THE PLACE OF LAW IN MEDIATION, MEMO # 6 (1984) (copy
on file with author); Riskin, supra note 35, at 330.
39. As mediation is practiced in new arenas, this traditional understanding is being modified. In
special education mediation, for example, Susan Silbey has observed that "the law and institutional
practices made available by law are actively shaping both the mediation and the outcomes." Susan S.
Silbey, Patrick Davis: To Bring Out the Best ... To Undo a Little Pain in Special Education
Mediation, in WHEN TALK WORKS, supra note 23, at 61, 64. See also JOEL F. HANDLER, THE
CONDMONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY, BUREAUCRACY (1986).
40. Accord PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNIcK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANStTION: TOWARD
RESPONSIVE LAW 77 (1978) (calling for an approach to justice that retains an openness to other sources
of knowledge instead of adherence to a "formalist, rule-bound" tradition).
41. I refer to "self' in the collective sense of both parties to the conflict, bearing in mind Lon
Fuller's conceptual understanding of the relational aspect of mediation. See Fuller, supra note 24, at
325. This highly individualistic moral reference point in court mediation raises significant questions
about the ownership of disputes. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A
Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2680 (1995);
Professor Frank Sander, Remarks at the Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting, San
Antonio, Texas (Jan. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Sander Remarks].
42. See, eg., BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 25, at 16; Riskin, supra note 30, at 34; Joshua D.
Rosenberg, In Defense of Mediation, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 467 (1991).
43. See Albie M. Davis & Janet Rifkin, A Conversation Between Friends, CONCILIATION Q.,
Winter/Spring 1994, at 2, 3 (noting that "mediation makes it possible for people to tell their stories"
and that "[other forums silence talk").
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therefore, is not abandoned in mediation, but it shares a home with a family
of diverse values including autonomy, self-determination, and personal
recognition. '
C. The Development of Court Mediation
The development of court mediation over the past twenty years is part
of the overall growth of the alternative dispute resolution (ADR)45
movement." The 1976 Pound Conference, at which judges, court
44. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 33, at 267-70 (describing the "unique capacities" of mediation);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process,
1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 52-53 (1985) (suggesting that mediation can "modify the harshness of
the adversarial process and expand the kinds of solutions available").
45. In this article, the term "alternative dispute resolution" refers to processes which are
alternatives to court adjudication of disputes. These include arbitration, mediation, negotiation, mini-
trials, and summary jury trials. See generally STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES (2d ed. 1992).
46. However, mediation is not a new phenomenon in the United States. Mediative forms of
conflict resolution were common among early immigrant and religious groups. See FOLBERG &
TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 3-4; Susan L. Donegan, ADR in ColonialAmerica: A Covenant for Survival,
ARB. J., June 1993, at 14; Leigh-Wai Doo, Dispute Settlement in Chinese-American Communities, 21
AM. J. COMP. L. 627,630 (1973); George S. Odiome,Arbitration and Mediation Among Early Quakers,
9 ARB. J. 161 (1954). See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW?. (1983). Other
conciliatory approaches to conflict resolution may be found in the culture of Native American
peacemaking. See generally Philmer Bluehouse & James W. Zion, Hozhooji Naat'aanii: The Navajo
Justice and Harmony Ceremony, 10 MEDIATION Q. 327 (1993).
In the early-twentieth century, Congress turned to mediation to resolve labor-management disputes.
In 1913, Congress created the Department of Labor and provided that the Secretary of Labor act as a
mediator. WILLIAM E. SIMKIN & NICHOLAS A. FIDANDIS, MEDIATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 25 (2d ed. 1986). In 1947, Congress created the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service to mediate labor disputes. Id. at 25, 37-38. The continued use of mediation in
labor-management conflicts attests to its longstanding value in these types of labor disputes.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, community mediation programs were developed and encouraged
by the federal government primarily to resolve interpersonal disputes in urban areas. Much of the
activity was carried out by the Law Enfbrcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) Division of the
United States Department of Justice. KOVACH, supra note 8, at 21-22. Community programs and
Neighborhood Justice Centers used volunteer mediators from the community. Id. at 22. Today, most
community programs have expanded intake to include more than minor disputes, and thus, many are
now called Dispute Resolution Centers. Id. See also Daniel McGillis, Minor Dispute Processing: A
Review of Recent Developments, in NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE: ASSESSMENT OF AN EMERGING IDEA 60,
64-66 (Roman Tomasic & Malcolm M. Feeley eds., 1982) (describing types of disputes handled in
minor dispute center projects).
Parallel activities have developed in the private sector as well. Over the last two decades, the
business of mediation has flourished, with retired judges, lawyers, and non-lawyers competing for cases.
Promoted as a "better way" to resolve disputes and as the "sleeping giant of business dispute resolu-
tion," JAMES F. HENRY & JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE MANAGER'S GUIDE TO RESOLVING LEGAL
DISPUTES: BETrER RESULTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 57 (1985), mediation services are now offered by
a growing market of private dispute resolution providers. An example of this would be the recent
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administrators, and legal scholars examined general dissatisfaction with the
justice system, marked the beginning of a systematic effort to introduce
mediation in the courts as an alternative to adjudication.47 Experimentation
began in small claims court, the paradigmatic informal court instituted at
the turn of the century to provide an "alternative" to the formal court
system.4 ' The informality and low financial stakes of small claims court
made it a good testing ground for introducing mediation to the court
system.49
DISPUTES: BETTER RESULTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 57 (1985), mediation services are now offered by
a growing market of private dispute resolution providers. An example of this would be the recent
publication of the MARTINDALE-HUBBELL DISPUTE RESOLUTION DIRECTORY (1994). See generally
Bryant G. Garth, Privatization and the New Market for Disputes: A Framework for Analysis and a
Preliminary Assessment, 12 STUD. L. POL. & Soc'Y 367 (1992).
47. See Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982). The Pound
Conference, held on April 7-9, 1976, in St. Paul, Minnesota, had a significant influence on establishing
court ADR programs. KOVACH, supra note 8, at 21. See generally, POUND CONFERENCE, supra note
1.
48. It is paradoxical that mediation practice in small claims court involves one "alternative" that
displaces the "other." Having spent a number of years conducting a mediation clinic in small claims
courts, I feel compelled to mention some of the benefits of mediation for litigants in this arena. In
general, mediation may provide litigants with a meaningful alternative to trial before a judge or arbitra-
tor. Litigants may gain access to a wider range of relief than would otherwise be available in court.
Even though the courts' jurisdiction is limited to money awards, money is not always an important issue
for litigants in the informal courts. Some parties have a strong desire to tell their stories rather than to
achieve specific outcomes. Often, parties need an apology, equitable relief such as rescission or specie
performance, assurances of compliance, or simply the opportunity to clear the air. All these are possible
in mediation, but are not generally available in adjudication. Litigants who lack communication skills
and the resources to hire an attorney to negotiate for them often benefit from a mediator's assistance
in their negotiations. See Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the
Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. 3. DIsP. RESOL. 235, 248, 249 (1993) (explaining how mediators can
help parties overcome various barriers to negotiation). Additionally, many of the problems in cases that
are brought to small claims court involve relationships that will continue after a judgment is rendered.
More often than not, parties will leave mediation on speaking terms with each other even if they do not
settle. Finally, I note that empirical studies show high compliance rates with mediated outcomes. See,
e.g., Craig A. McEwen & Richard . Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical
Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237, 260-64 (1981).
For a general discussion of the advantages of mediation over adjudication, see Riskin, supra note
30, at 34. For a reflective listing of the most favorable aspects of settlement see Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 41, at 2692.
49. Much has been written on the use of mediation in small claims courts. See, e.g., WILLIAM
DEJONG ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE USE OF MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION IN SMALL CLAIMS
DISPUTES (1983); Michael S. Gillie, A State-Level Approach to Community Arbitration and Mediation,
MEDIATION Q., Sept. 1984, at 53; McEwen & Maiman, supra note 48, at 243-68; Robert V. Strena &
George D. Westermark, Arbitration and Mediation In a Neighborhood Small Claims Project,
MEDIATION Q., Sept. 1984, at 39; Neil Vidmar, An Assessment of Mediation in a Small Claims Court,
41 J. Soc. ISSUES 127 (1985); Neil Vidmar, The Mediation of Small Claims Court Disputes: A Critical
Perspective, in I RESEARCH ON NEGOTIATION IN ORGANIZATIONS (R. Lewicki et al. eds., 1986);
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Today, mediation practice has expanded from informal courts5" to state
and federal courts"' of general jurisdiction.52 Settlement rates have been
significant.53 Programs range from the purely voluntary to mandatory,54
Vidmar, supra note 37, at 522-49.
Mediation continues to have a visible presence in small claims courts today. See Goerdt, supra note
36, at 13. See generally Susan E. Raitt et al., The Use of Mediation in Small Claims Courts, 9 OHIO
ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 55 (1993).
50. JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE
ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE 24-26 (1990).
51. See generally BRUCE BRODIGAN ET AL., AMERICAN BAR ASs'N, FEDERAL LEGISLATION ON
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ABA Standing Comm. on Dispute Resolution Monograph Series No. I1B 1988);
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS AND PUB. SERV. GROUP, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, LEGISLATION ON DISPUTE
RESOLUTION (1990). See also PLAPINGER & SHAW, supra note 4, at x; NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG
A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE ch. 5 (2d ed. 1994).
52. See generally FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., COURT-BASED DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAMS
(1991). The development of many mediation programs in federal court has resulted from the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Star. 5090 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 471-482 (Supp. V. 1993)), which requires federal courts to examine their caseloads and develop a
management plan, referred to in the Act as a "civil justice expense and delay reduction plan" (EDRP).
28 U.S.C. § 471. Congress recommended that courts, in implementing the EDRP, "refer appropriate
cases to alternative dispute resolution programs." 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6). Mediation was specifically
mentioned as a possible alternative. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6)(B). A large number of EDRPs in federal
courts today provide for mediation. REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT,
1992 A.B.A. SEC. ON LITIG. 38.
Some courts have instituted mandatory mediation programs as a result of the Act (e.g., Southern
District of New York), while others have voluntary programs (e.g., Eastern District of New York).
PLAPINGER & SHAw, supra note 4, at 150. For a list of ADR programs adopted under the Act by the
end of 1991, see id. app. b.
53. For multi-jurisdiction studies of settlement rates, see JOHN A. GOERDT, SMALL CLAIMS AND
TRAFFIC COURTS: CASE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES, CASE CHARACTERISTICS, AND OUTCOMES IN 12
URBAN JURISDICTIONS 32 (1992) (finding 50% to 95% settlement rates); Henry W.K. Daley & Susan
Keilitz, Court-based Family Mediation Programs, STAT. CT. J., Fall 1992, at 24, 26-27 (reporting
agreement rates ranging from 34% to 74% in four jurisdictions, three of which mandate mediation);
Goerdt, supra note 36, at 13 (reporting 47% to 85% agreement rates in mediations conducted in three
urban jurisdictions, with those having voluntary programs reporting the higher rates); Pearson, Family
Mediation, supra note 36, at 60 (concluding from fifteen studies that in contested custody and visitation
cases, 50% to 75% of cases result in settlement). For single jurisdiction studies of settlement rates, see
McEwen & Maiman, supra note 48, at 249-50 (finding that 66.1% of small claims cases resulted in an
agreement); Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 36, at 456 (finding that 41% of users of a mandatory
mediation program in California, and 35% and 41% of users of voluntary programs in Connecticut and
Minneapolis, respectively, reached final agreements in mediation); Raitt et al., supra note 49, at 67 (fn-
ding that over 50% of small claims cases referred to mandatory mediation in Multnomah County,
Oregon resulted in settlement); id. at 80 (citing JOSHUA ROSENBERG ET AL., UNIVERSITY OF SAN
FRANCISCO FINAL REP. TO THE JUD. COUNCIL 2 (1992)) (reporting 80% settlement rate in California
small claims mediation program).
54. There are many variations in the level and degree of mandatory programs. Thus, it is often
difficult to be accurate in labeling a mediation program either mandatory or voluntary. See Sander
Remarks, supra note 41. Courts use a variety of strategies short of forced engagement to induce parties
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depending upon state legislatures55 and court administrators. Low
voluntary usage 6 has resulted, however, in a gradual shift to mandatory
mediation. 7 Despite much critical concern,58 mandatory mediation
programs continue. 9
The growth of mandatory court referral programs 6  undercuts the
to mediate, including mandatory information and evaluation sessions for divorce mediation. See, e.g.,
Nancy A. Burrell et al., Evaluating Parental Stressors of Divorcing Couples Referred to Mediation and
Effects on Mediation Outcomes, 11 MEDIATION Q. 339, 343 (1994) (discussing WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 767.11(8) (West 1993), which "mandates that couples filing for divorce with custody or visitation
issues attend information and evaluation sessions to learn about mediation as a means for resolving
disputes and to assess the appropriateness of the process for their individual cases"). For a detailed
discussion on the meaning of participation in mandatory mediation programs, see ROGERS & MCEWEN,
supra note 51, § 7:06.
55. Several statutes provide that courts may exclude from mediation certain categories of cases
such as child abuse and domestic violence. See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, pam.
5/607.1(c)(4) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (providing that courts may not order mediation in cases of domestic
violence); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3.500(2)(b) (Michie Supp. 1993) (permitting exclusion of child
abuse and domestic violence cases from mediation programs).
56. McEwen & Milbum, supra note 36, at 23; Sally E. Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What Do
Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept of Dispute, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 151, 151-54 (1984); Jessica
Pearson, An Evaluation of Alternatives to Court Adjudication, 7 JUST. SYS. J. 420, 427 (1982).
57. See PLAPINGER & SHAW, supra note 4, at 1-13. See generally Edward F. Sherman, Court-
Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Form of Participation Should be Required?, 46 SMU
L. REV. 2079, 2084-2089 (1993) (discussing and applying four principles for determining forms of
participation in court-ordered ADR that are consistent with the litigation system).
58. See, e.g., Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J.
1545 (1991); Richard Ingleby, Court Sponsored Mediation: The Case Against Mandatory Participation,
56 MOD. L. REv. 441 (1993); Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy
and Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. DisP. RESOL. 1, 12
(1993). See generally ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 51, ch.7. Some commentators, however, have
suggested that parties express satisfaction with mandatory mediation. See, e.g., McEwen & Milbum,
supra note 36, at 23; Rosenberg, supra note 42, at 468 (citing Mary A. Duryee, A Consumer Evaluation
of a Court Mediation Service, in REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
(1991)).
59. The National Standards for Court-Connected Mediation Programs give guarded approval to
mandatory court mediation programs. Standard 5.1 provides: "Mandatory attendance at an initial
mediation session may be appropriate, but only when a mandate is more likely to serve the interests of
parties (including those not represented by counsel), the justice system and the public than would
voluntary attendance." CENTER FOR DISP. SETTLEMENT, INSTITUTE OF JUD. ADMIN., NATIONAL
STANDARDS FOR COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION PROGRAMS standard 5.1 (1992) (hereinafter NATIONAL
STANDARDS).
60. For a critique of court-referred mediation, see Louis J. Weber, Jr., Court-Referred ADR and
the Lawyer-Mediator: In Service of Whom?, 46 SMU L. REV. 2113, 2114 (1993) (describing court-
referred ADR as an "additional" rather than an "alternative" dispute resolution process that benefits
lawyers more than the public). For a discussion of four forms of participation required in ADR, see
Sherman, supra note 57, at 2089-111.
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traditional voluntariness of mediation.6' Unlike disputing parties who go
"to a mediator because they are stuck,"62 court mediation often "sticks"
parties with a mediator.6' Given the coercive behavior of some media-
tors,64 unrepresented parties are at risk.65 Even in programs which are not
strictly mandatory, when court personnel encourage parties to mediate, the
invitation is not lightly refused. Particularly for unrepresented litigants, such
a suggestion from an authority figure can easily be perceived as a
command.66 Without lawyers, parties may not recognize the subtle
61. Additionally, unlike traditional mediation, court-based mediation is likely to have the attributes
of a zero-sum game. The notion that parties should be searching for mutually acceptable resolutions
may not appeal to litigants who expect a winner and a loser, parties who come to court may be less
interested in building consensus than in claiming their legal entitlements or seeking vengeance.
Particularly in a small claims court setting, where judicial relief is generally limited to monetary awards,
issues are likely to appear predominantly "distributive" in nature and are not easily processed through
the integrative bargaining approach of problem-solving negotiation.
62. David E. Matz describes the typical disputant who chooses mediation:
Parties come to a mediator because they are stuck. Going ahead with their dispute without
mediation has become too painful, expensive, or difficult; and, conversely, letting go of the
dispute and ignoring it does not seem possible either. The parties are too invested in the
dispute to let go or ignore it. Thus they are stuck, and come to the mediator to help them get
unstuck.
Matz, supra note 32, at 360.
63. This happens unless litigants are permitted to choose mediators. Practice varies from state to
state.
64. See, e.g., James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of "Good
Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 47, 66 (1991) (discussing three "distinct styles" of mediators).
See also Nader, supra note 58, at 13 ("Discussion of blame or rights is avoided and replaced by the
rhetoric of compromise and relationship; cultural notions of justice are factored out.").
It should be noted that mediators have an arsenal of techniques which can be used to pressure parties
into settlement. See, e.g., Peter J.D. Camevale et al., Contingent Mediator Behavior and Its
Effectiveness, in MEDIATION RESEARCH, supra note 35, at 213, 216-17 (listing thirty-six mediation
tactics). Some commentators believe that pressuring parties is permissible. See, e.g., David E. Matz,
supra note 32, at 360 ("I believe it is accurate to say that almost all mediators apply pressure on the
parties with whom they work. This is inevitable and, in my judgment, it is a good thing."). Some
commentators have also suggested that mediators can influence parties into ignoring their fundamental
interests. See Boskey, supra note 25, at 368.
Other studies show that mediators use various strategies, but all of them are directed toward
producing settlements. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 25, at 37-39, 44-45; Susan S. Silbey & Sally
E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 L. & POL'Y 7, 19 (1986) (describing a bargaining and a
therapeutic style of mediation).
65. Other types of ineffectual mediator behavior can also be harmful to unrepresented litigants.
One unsatisfied tenant in small claims court mediation who had sued her landlord, an attorney,
described her mediator as "soft spoken, somewhat timid. She did not point out that personal testimony
and private details were irrelevant." Clark, supra note 36, at 15.
66. Recognizing this danger, SPIDR has suggested that "[w]hen the parties are unrepresented by
counsel, special efforts should be made to make the parties aware of alternatives to settlement and to
avoid practices that make them feel that they must settle." LAW & PUB. POLICY COMM., SOCIETY OF
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differences between referral to mediation, compulsion to mediate, and
friendly coercion to reach a settlement.67 Fortunately, the developing case
law in this area shows that courts do not require that settlement be reached
when mediation is required.6
The rhetoric of early proponents suggested that mediation was a boon to
the legal community as well as to disputants, 69 and that it would result in
a "peaceful and evolutionary revolution in the way people think and act in
general."70 The reality is different.7' Many courts have adopted an
instrumentalist, rather than a transformative or peacemaking approach,
looking to mediation as a way to bring greater efficiency and reduce
dockets.72 Settlement is the goal of this enterprise,7 and judges view
PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION, MANDATED PARTICIPATION AND SETTLEMENT COERCION:
DISPUTE RESOLUTION AS IT RELATES TO THE COURTS 20 (1991) [hereinafter SPIDR REPORT].
67. The National Standards for Court-Connected Mediation Programs require courts to be sensitive
in this area. Standard 11.2 provides: "Courts should provide parties who are required to participate in
mediation with full and accurate information about the process to which they are being referred,
including the fact that they are not required to make offers and concessions or to settle." NATIONAL
STANDARDS, supra note 59, standard 11.2.
68. In Decker v. Lindsay, 824 S.W.2d 247, 252 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992), for example, a trial judge's
order requiring parties to mediate was set aside because it was held to have exceeded the relevant
statutory provision, which required only mandatory referral, not mandatory negotiation.
There are a growing number of cases dealing with "referral" to mediation: In re Stone, 986 F.2d
898, 903, 905 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that attendance by a representative with full settlement authority
may be required by a district court at pretrial conferences, but when the government is a litigant, courts
should consider less drastic steps before requiring the government to do so in all circumstances);
Physicians Protective Trust Fund v. Overman, 636 So. 2d 827, 829 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that
a court's order requiring an entire Board of Trustees to attend mediation as sanction for previous
noncompliance does not depart from "the essential requirements of law"); Avril v. Civilmar, 605 So.
2d 988, 989-90 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that state mediation statute does not require parties to
settle or even make an offer at mediation); Graham v. Baker, 447 N.W.2d 397, 401 (Iowa 1989)
(holding that attendance and refusal to deviate from pre-mediation position satisfies the minimal partici-
pation required by state statute); Obermoller v. Federal Land Bank, 409 N.W.2d 229, 231-32 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987) (holding that continued attendance accompanied by refusal to waive argument that
mediation laws do not apply to case insufficient to prove bad faith).
69. Lawrence H. Cooke, Mediation: A Boon or a Bust?, in MEDIATION IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
3, 17 (Maria I Volpe et a]. eds., 1983).
70. Lande, supra note 27, at 19.
71. I note that in the informal courts, the reality of litigation may also be quite different from what
parties expected. See infra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Note, The Sultans of Swap: Defining the Duties and Liabilities of American
Mediators, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1876, 1882 (1986). But see BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 25, at 274
(reporting that some courts are now more interested in mediation as a means of providing a valuable
"community service" than as a mere settlement device).
73. This approach is contrary to that adopted by the National Standards for Court-Connected
Mediation. Standard 11.4 provides: "Settlement rates should not be the sole criterion for mediation
program funding, mediator advancement, or program evaluation." NATIONAL STANDARDS, supra note
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mediation as a tool of good court management.74 Indeed, some studies
suggest that a majority of Americans also adopt the utilitarian, or
instrumentalist, approach to court mediation.7'
D. The Paradox of Court Mediation
Litigants come to court for different reasons. Some seek justice through
law; that is, a judge's decision based on the rule of law. Other litigants
hope to coerce their opponents through legal means.76 Whatever their
original purpose in seeking the court's intervention in their disputes, after
referral to mediation, their dispute resolution activity takes place without
the official power of law, but nonetheless under its aegis.77 When the
court refers litigants to mediation, the litigants themselves are required to
become the decision makers. This, then, is the paradox of court-based
mediation: Despite the initial search for justice based on an objective
standard outside of themselves, namely law, disputing parties are required
by courts and coached by mediators to place the locus of decision making
in themselves. The result is "individualized justice."78 The parties' original
expectations for justice through law have been suspended. The court is now
59, standard 11.4.
74. Medley & Schellenberg, supra note 28, at 334. See also Goerdt, supra note 36, at 13, 49
(evaluating success of mediation programs based upon, among other things, their ability to alleviate
heavy caseloads). But see Rodney S. Webb, Court-Annexed "ADR"--A Dissent, 70 N.D. L. REv. 229,
234 (1994) (conveying one judge's view that alternatives such as mediation should be supplied by the
private sector, not the federal courts).
75. An ABA Joumal-Gallup poll showed that 87% of Americans believe that requiring mediation
or arbitration for some types of cases is a way to reduce costs of the justice system. Don J.
DeBenedictis, Struggling Toward Recovery, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994, at 50, 52.
76. Unfortunately, attorneys play a role in some of this behavior. See, e.g., THOMAS L. SHAFFER
& ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 13 (1994).
77. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (observing, in the context of negotiations outside court, the
probable outcome in court if the parties do not reach an agreement).
78. My thinking in this regard has been influenced by Professor P.S. Atiyah's essay, From
Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial Process and the Law, 65 IOWA L.
REV. 1249, 1259 (1980). Professor Atiyah laments that in the modem trend away from the deterrent
function and toward the dispute settlement function of law, there is an assumption that "[j]ustice can
only be done by the individualized, ad hoc approach, by examining the facts of the particular case in
great detail and determining what appears to be fair, having regard to what has happened." Id. at 1256.
He characterizes this trend as the move from principles to pragmatism. Id.
Recently, the concept of individualized justice has been the subject of much discussion in connection
with the settlement of mass tort cases. See Cramton, supra note 14; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and
the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1159, 1203-05
(1995).
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promising a form of justice which results more from individual preferences
than from externally imposed standards. In addition to considering the law,
parties are also invited to act creatively and pursue their personal sense of
fairness based on nonlegal values such as culture, morals, and individual
ethics.
But referral to mediation does not necessarily diminish the importance
of law for those parties who sought its protection when they first came to
court.79 In fact, law may have an exaggerated sense of value because of
the feeling that the parties have lost the right to see a judge.8" Parties who
choose to bring their conflicts into the public domain of the court system
are likely to have strong beliefs about their legal entitlements."' For them,
law may be an important, if not predominant, value.82 Otherwise, they
might have resolved their disputes with less costly solutions, such as
79. Of course, why people settle or do not settle in mediation may have little to do with the law.
In my experience in the informal courts, parties may settle a case based on nuisance value, to avoid
coming back to court on a future date, or to avoid ever having to deal with their adversaries again.
Likewise, parties may refuse to settle based on "principle," or because of a desire for black-robed
justice. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lawyer Negotiations: Theories and Realities-What We
Learn from Mediation, 56 MOD. L. REv. 361 (1993).
80. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 36, at 14. In criticizing her experience with small claims court
mediation, the author writes: "I think I'll always fantasize about a courtroom experience where the
judge bellows out commands like a Roman senator, ordering the landlord to produce the appropriate
documents, even scolding the landowner for cheating the serf!" Id.
For a different view however, see SPECIAL COMM. ON ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, ALTERNATIVE DIsPuTE RESOLUTION: WHO'S IN CHARGE OF
MEDIATION? 78 (1982). One commentator, in speaking of a mediation program, said: "In a court-based
program such as in Waterbury, people have their chance to go to court and have the judge refer their
case to mediation. At least, they have had the chance to see the 'man'; they have had their day in
court." Id.
81. For a lego-anthropological view on the meaning of law in local courts, see Barbara Yngvesson,
Inventing Law in Local Settings: Rethinking Popular Legal Culture, 98 YALE L.J. 1689 (1989).
82. According to Merry and Silbey's study:
[Citizens do not use alternatives voluntarily to the extent hoped for by proponents of
[Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms] because by the time a conflict is serious enough
to warrant an outsider's intervention, disputants do not want what alternatives have to offer.
At this point, the grievant wants vindication, protection of his or her rights (as he or she
perceives them), an advocate to help in the battle, or a third party who will uncover the
"truth" and declare the other party wrong.
Merry & Silbey, supra note 56, at 153.
I am aware, of course, that reasons other than the vindication of rights bring parties to court. For
example, researeh by Professors O'Barr and Conley suggests that "The People's Court" television show,
what they term the "Wapner factor," may be a significant factor in a decision to bring a case to small
claims court. William M. O'Barr & John M. Conley, Lay Expectations of the Civil Justice System, 22
L. & Soc'Y REv. 137, 152 n.l 1 (1988); see also Raitt et al., supra note 49, at 56 n.5 (suggesting that
the TV show "The People's Court" encourages people's litigiousness by making it seem "OK to sue
over two bucks' worth of pizza." (citations omitted)).
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avoidance or a handshake.
In Part II, I offer a normative view of the value of law in court
mediation. I then discuss two case studies that suggest that the role of law
in court mediation is very much dependent upon the mediator's behavior.
II. THE INFLUENCE OF LAW IN COURT MEDIATION
A. Why Law Matters in Court Mediation
Court mediation is different from other types of mediation because it
takes place under the auspices of the legal system. Unlike mediation that
occurs in a neighbor's garden or a sidewalk cafe, where no one expects that
their legal rights will be protected, or for that matter, necessarily respected,
court mediation carries with it higher expectations of legal protection.
Court-bound individuals are generally a rights-conscious group. The claim
or assertion of legal rights is usually what brings them to court in the first
instance. 3 To the extent that bargaining is part of the dispute resolution
process of court mediation, knowledge of law should be part of the process
in which those claims are modified and compromised. Legal rights are, in
some form or shape, the subject matter of the bargaining, and it is difficult
to imagine any credible bargaining session in which the subject matter of
the bargaining is absent from discussion.
I am not suggesting that law should be the primary focus of the court
mediation process.84 Parties will assert or disregard their legal rights in
proportion to the value they place on them. For some litigants, conserving
time may be more important than receiving an award of money. For others,
the opportunity to vent may be more important than the right to void a
contract. However, despite the choice of nonlegal values that may influence
or determine the outcome of court mediation, law is still very much
connected to the enterprise. Law motivates the choice of court as the forum
for resolving disputes; law prompts the claims that are asserted; law
determines the legality and enforceability of the outcome. I suggest that law
should also inform whatever bargaining takes place, because in court
83. As Frank Michelman has noted, "the sense of legal rights as claims whose realization has
intrinsic value can fairly be called rampant in our culture and traditions'" Frank I. Michelman, The
Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Own Rights (pt. 1), 1973 DUKE
L.J. 1153, 1177.
84. If that were the case, then why not have a judge?
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mediation, there is a dialectical relationship" between legal and nonlegal
values: rights are often interdependent with the parties' nonlegal and
equitable interests. Thus, parties in court mediation have dual tasks: they
must be able to understand their legal rights and at the same time be able
to acknowledge how their individual and community interests find
expression in or outside of these rights.
The legal right to receive treble damages for violations of the housing
code may be less important to a tenant than her immediate need for
habitable housing. Likewise, the right to assert a statute of limitations
defense in a small claims court trial may pale in importance to the time
savings of a quick settlement for a busy business person. The cathartic
effect of confronting a person who has personally offended you and
receiving an immediate apology from that person can outweigh the value
of an impersonal court judgment.87 In short, balancing legal rights and
nonlegal interests involves tradeoffs, and making informed decisions about
tradeoffs requires knowledge of law. It is in this dualism that authentic self-
determination is exercised and that the counterpart to justice through law
is achieved.88
The reality of court mediation practice today is otherwise. As I
demonstrate in the following two case studies, unrepresented litigants may
not be capable of making informed decisions about the tradeoffs involved
with balancing legal and nonlegal interests. The sad result is often a hit-or-
miss type of justice.
B. Case Studies
The following cases offer some practical understanding of the role of law
in court mediation today. They illustrate some of the ways in which law is
included and excluded in the court mediation process where one or both of
the parties are unrepresented by counsel. These case studies are based on
actual mediation sessions in a New York City small claims court89 and
85. See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from
the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986).
86. In Manhattan Small Claims Court, it is not unusual for parties to make three appearances
several months apart before they will be granted the right to a trial before a judge.
87. There is no shortage of anecdotal evidence on this from the Fordham Mediation Clinic.
88. See infra notes 207-16 and accompanying text.
89. A "small claim" is defined in the relevant New York statutes as "any cause of action for
money only not in excess of two thousand dollars." N.Y. UNIFORM CITY CT. ACT § 1801 (McKinney
1989); N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. AcT § 1801 (McKinney 1989). See also N.Y. CITY Ctv. CT. ACT
§ 1801 (McKinney Supp. 1995) (three thousand dollar maximum).
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were mediated by a law student in the Mediation Clinic at Fordham
University School of Law." Notice the mediator's control over the extent
to which law influences the mediation sessions and how this control
ultimately affects the outcome of the mediation process. In the first case,
the mediator's uneasy avoidance of law, while it contributed to settlement,
raises questions about the ultimate fairness of the agreement reached in that
settlement. In the second case, the mediator's exclusive focus on the legal
merits of the case prevented settlement.91
1. The Health Club Membership Dispute
a) Background
The claimant purchased a one-year membership from a fitness club, paid
an initiation fee of $312.00, and agreed to pay monthly charges of $75.00.
After using the club facilities for two months, he tried to cancel his
membership because he believed that he had been misled about available
equipment and facilities. The club refused to cancel the claimant's
membership because the claimant failed to cancel within the time
prescribed in his contract. The claimant then attempted to sell his
membership but was prevented from doing so when the club offered the
potential buyer a lower price. (The club denied this accusation.) The
claimant was charged monthly fees of $75.00 to his credit card for nine
months, during only two of which he actually used the club. He sued in
small claims court to recover the $312.00 initiation fee.
In court, the club was represented by its corporate counsel. The claimant
appeared pro se. During the mediation session, the claimant sought to
recover the monthly charges that had been charged to his credit card
despite the fact that his initial complaint was simply to recover the
initiation fee.
The case was settled in mediation with the defendant agreeing to credit
$200.00 to the claimant's credit card and terminate the contract.
b) Mediator's Reflections
While tough, the defendant's attorney seemed willing to talk settle-
90. The student who mediated these cases gave me permission to use her narratives. These cases
are presented as illustrations of some of the ways in which legal issues arise in court mediation
programs where one or both parties are not represented by counsel.
91. This exclusive focus on law blocked her vision to non-legal values which could have
contributed to a beneficial resolution acknowledging the dignity of jointly-shared values.
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ment.... This case was important, first and foremost, because it was my
first settlement and I was beginning to think I would never settle any (I think
it's the hallway92 thing). The only thorny legal issue that bothered me during
the negotiations was the initial misrepresentation by the club. This kind of
gnawed at me; I kept feeling that if the claimant could prove this, then the
court might rescind the contract altogether. Nonetheless, I concentrated on
what the parties wanted. It became clear that the inexperienced claimant (who
was only suing for the initiation fee) wanted out of the contract and that the
club wanted to get this guy off their back. Consequently, the legal issue of
misrepresentation became incidental to the negotiations .... The only ethical
issue which arose was how to deal with the inequity of legal knowledge of
the parties. While the young claimant (college age) was intelligent and
handled himself well given the circumstances, it was difficult not [to] help
him out a little. I think I did okay because I have found that when I have an
attorney and a pro se party, I keep impartiality if I treat them both as if they
are parties, irrespective of their professional status. In this particular case, this
was easy to do because the attorney for the defendant was understanding and
amiable. All in all, I think that both parties left satisfied, especially the
claimant.
c) Discussion
The mediator was initially troubled by what she considered the health
club's misrepresentation. Its tortious act "gnawed" at her, suggesting that
the remedy of rescission might be available to the claimant if the case were
decided by the court.93 However, is protecting the claimant's legal rights
part of her responsibility?94 In this case, she focused on the merits of
party autonomy and self-determination.9" Thus, despite her initial misgiv-
ings, she decided to go ahead with the mediation and "concentrated on
92. This mediation session occurred in a private hallway behind the courtroom, with all parties
standing up.
93. In fact, equitable relief is generally not available in small claims court. See Hellman v. Ploss,
359 N.Y.S.2d 823, 826 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (Shapiro, J., dissenting) (stating that it is generally
beyond jurisdiction of small claims court to grant equitable relief), appeal dismissed, 330 N.E.2d 645
(N.Y. 1975); Goldstein v. Stephens, 463 N.Y.S.2d 137, 138 (N.Y. App. Term 1983) (same); cf. Scott
v. Dale Carpet Cleaning, Inc., 465 N.Y.S.2d 680, 681 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1983) (holding that small claims
courts "possess[] strictly limited equitable powers").
94. The mediator's quandary is part of an ongoing debate about the propriety of giving legal
advice in mediation. See, e.g., James Alfini & Gerald S. Clay, Should Lawyer-Mediators be Prohibited
from Providing Legal Advice or Evaluations?, DiSp. REsOL. MAo., Spring 1994, at 8. See infra notes
148-61 and accompanying text.
95. This mediator's decision to focus on what the parties wanted supports the view that self-
determination is the controlling principle in mediation. See supra note 8.
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what the parties wanted," which was quite simply to end their business
relationship.
Still, an ethical dilemma remained: How would she manage the "inequity
of legal knowledge of the parties"? 96 The mediator's response was a
decision to "help" the claimant "a little."97 We are not told what she did,
so we can only speculate about how this help was offered. Did she advise
the claimant to consult with a lawyer?9' Did she discuss her thoughts
about misrepresentation or rescission with him? Probably not. Her next
immediate concern was with mediator neutrality. 99 "I think I did okay
because I have found that when I have an attorney and a pro se party, I
keep impartiality if I treat them both as if they are parties, irrespective of
their professional status."
The narrative ends on a comforting note for the mediator who concludes
that both parties, especially the claimant, -were satisfied with the result.
While this is good news for the mediator, it is not surprising. Empirical
studies generally show a high degree of party satisfaction with the
mediation process." The real question, however, is whether a more
knowledgeable claimant would have been satisfied with this mediation
agreement.' 0'
The claimant who sued for $312.00 settled in mediation for $200.00 and
termination of his contract with the health club. It is unknown whether he
would have achieved a better result through court adjudication. 2 If,
96. Professor Robert A.B. Bush has identified this as an ethical dilemma in mediation. See
ROBERT A.B. BUSH, NATIONAL INST. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, THE DILEMMAS OF MEDIATION
PRACTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICAL DILEMMAS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 15 (1992), reprinted in 1994
J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 21.
97. The mediator's concern over the pro se litigant's lack of legal knowledge is not unlike the
discomfort experienced by small claims court judges when pro se litigants are opposed by parties with
legal counsel. While some judges' instinctive reaction is to give assistance to the pro se party, they
report qualms about doing so because it conflicts with their role. JOHN C. RUHNKA ET AL., NATIONAL
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, SMALL CLAIMS COURTS: A NATIONAL EXAMINATION 29-31 (1978).
98. See infra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 22.
100. See supra note 36. See also BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 25, at 16-18; Craig A. McEwen &
Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Consensual Processes and Outcomes, in
MEDIATION RESEARCH, supra note 35, at 53, 58-59; Roehl & Cook, supra note 35, at 33, 44.
101. I refer here to knowledge about legal rights. See infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
102. We need more empirical research comparing adjudicated outcomes with mediated outcomes.
Michele Hermann's study comparing outcomes in mediation and adjudication shows that minority
claimants fare less well monetarily in mediation. HERMANN ET AL., supra note 35, at 116; see also
Arthur Best et al., Peace, Wealth, Happiness, and Small Claim Courts: A Case Study, 21 FORDHAM
URB. LJ. 343 (1994) (examining claims that plaintiffs often win in small claims court).
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during a trial, the claimant had questions about the relevant laws or
procedures, 3 it is likely that the small claims court judge would have
helped him.' For, despite some misgivings about violating neutrality,
judges" 5 in the informal courts play an active role in assisting litigants,
developing their testimony, and transforming their stories to fit theories of
liability."0 6 Assuming that the claimant met his burden of prooft 7 with
or without the judge's assistance, if the court awarded him the $312.00
initiation fee and he established fraud on the part of the Health Club under
the Health Club Services Law, t"' he might have been entitled to treble
103. As a practical matter, he would probably not even know what questions to ask. See BUSH,
supra note 96, at 15, reprinted in 1994 J. DISP. RESOL. at 21.
104. However, legal assistance from the judge would not necessarily guarantee a different result in
this case. In the informal courts, there are significant differences among individual judges in their
approaches to dispensing justice. See CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 50, at 111 ("[T]hc legal system
is less a system than it is an inconsistent collection of varying styles and approaches to law.'); RUHNKA
ET AL., supra note 97, ch. 2. Judges vary so much in outlook and orientation that, within the same
court, litigants may be presented with different perspectives. Depending upon which judge a litigant
draws, informal justice may mean a range of offerings from mediation to authoritative decision making.
See John M. Conley & William M. O'Barr, Fundamentals of Jurspntdence: An Ethnography of
Judicial Decision Making in Informal Courts, 66 N.C. L. REV. 467, 481-82 (1988).
For example, Professors Conley & O'Barr have identified five contrasting approaches ofjudges: (1)
the Strict Adherent to the Law, (2) the Lawmaker, (3) the Mediator, (4) the Authoritative Judge, and
(5) the Proceduralist. CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 50, at 82-112, 125. Further, even within the
Authoritative Judge Category, there are several different approaches. A different analysis is offered by
John Ruhnka's study of small claims court judges, which identifies two styles of judging: The
"inquisitorial" approach of the active judges involves asking plaintiffs specific questions "to establish
the necessary cause of action and proof of damages," asking defendants questions to establish any
defenses or mitigating elements, and cutting off "rambling or extraneous testimony" to speed up trials;
and the more passive approach of judges, who ask fewer questions and thus, give litigants more
freedom. RUHNKA ET AL., supra note 97, at 20.
105. The professional backgrounds and educational qualifications of informal court judges vary
considerably-some are not lawyers. CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 50, at 27.
106. Professors Conley and O'Barr observed a number of cases in which judges intervened to take
an active role in developing the testimony of one or both parties. CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 50,
at 49, 55. John Ruhnka's study of small claims courts reports that judges who helped pro se litigants
to explain their legal positions and to identify relevant facts worried about maintaining their neutrality.
RUHNKA ET AL., supra note 97, at 29-30. Judges were even more troubled when a pro se litigant was
opposed by an attorney: "When one side is without an attorney, the natural tendency of a judge is to
favor the underdog-and when the judge is acting as the lawyer for one side, as well as the judge, you
can imagine the judge's client will not lose too often." Id. at 30.
107. The claimant's burden of proof is less onerous in small claims court than it would be in the
formal courts. The rules of evidence and procedure are relaxed in small claims court, and the statute
provides that the court must "do substantial justice between the parties." N.Y. CITY CiV. CT. ACT
§ 1804 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
108. The Health Club Services Law created a private right of action to recover damages caused by
a health club's failure to provide promised services. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 628 (1984). The purpose
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damages and would have received over nine hundred dollars instead of the
two hundred dollars that was credited to his charge account' m9
In the final analysis, the mediator measured success by the parties'
satisfaction level, especially the claimant's. But was the result fair? Did
justice result?
2. The Stolen Purse
a) Background
The claimant's purse, containing $600.00 in cash and valuables, was
stolen from her chair while she attended a play at a local community
center. The claimant sued the center for $600.00 in damages. During the
mediation session, the claimant argued that she had expected safety and that
there should have been better security. The defendant denied liability,
claiming that the center was a public place and that while he felt sympa-
thetic to the claimant, the potential for crushing liability made it impossible
for him to ensure that the property of everyone who entered the place
would be safe. The defendant also presented evidence of signs that
disclaimed liability for stolen or lost property. The claimant stated that she
did not see any signs. The case did not settle in mediation and it was
returned to the trial calendar. 10
b) Mediator's Reflections
Given the facts as I understood them, I saw no way of settling the case.
of the statute was discussed in Faer v. Vertical Fitness & Racquet Club, Ltd., 462 N.Y.S.2d 784 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1983), modified, 486 N.Y.S.2d 594 (N.Y. App. Term 1984), the only reported case under the
statute:
[T]he purpose of this article is to safeguard the public and the ethical health club industry
against deception and financial hardship, and to foster and encourage competition, fair
dealing, and prosperity in the field of health club services by prohibiting or restricting false
or misleading advertising, erroneous contract terms, harmful financial practices, and other
unfair, deceptive and discriminatory practices which have been conducted by some health club
operators.
Id. at 787 (quoting N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 620).
109. If the claimant had chosen instead to arbitrate in small claims court, he might not have been
awarded treble damages because the arbitrator might have been unaware of this provision in the law.
Parties generally waive their right to appeal in small claims court. See, e.g., N.Y. CiTY Civ. CT. ACT
§ 1807 (McKinney 1989).
110. I am unaware of the ultimate disposition of this case. It is likely that the parties returned to
court one or two additional times before having a trial. In the Manhattan Small Claims Court, the
volume of cases makes it difficult to be heard by a judge at the first or even second court appearance.
There are an average of one hundred and twenty-five cases on the calendar each evening.
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I caucused with the defendant first and simply asked him if he was prepared
to make any offer whatsoever. He said no. Then I caucused with the claimant
and she did everything she could to get me to advise her of the law involved.
I declined to advise her on the law and appeased her with an analogy; I said
that I had read an article in the newspaper that explained how thousands of
people involved in the World Trade Center bombing were suing the Port
Authority for injuries and damage caused by the bombing, but that they had
no cause of action against the Port Authority because it was the criminals
who were responsible and liable and not the Port Authority. I think she got
my message, and she very amicably decided that she would try her luck in
front of the judge. (She realized that she would probably lose, but she felt
that she had nothing to lose.)
This case was instructive, as was my other case this evening, in teaching
me how to deal with situations where criminal activity is involved and the
claimant is trying to get monies from a party other than the thief. In
situations like the one presented here, there is obviously not going to be a
settlement, and it is important to recognize that and still be fair to the parties.
c) Discussion
The mediator is convinced from the outset that the claimant has no case
and, therefore, there is no way for the parties to settle."' Her opinion is
reinforced by the defendant's refusal to make any offer of settlement. The
claimant, however, is not similarly persuadedt2 She "did everything she
could" to obtain legal advice from the mediator, who decided to "appease"
rather than "advise" her." 3 Appeasement occurred through the use of an
analogy, a tactic seemingly calculated to influence the claimant."4
The mediator suggested to the claimant that just as the injured victims
of the 1993 bombing at the World Trade Center could not successfully sue
the New York Port Authority because of intervening criminal activity, so
too the claimant could not sue the center. The analogy is imperfect since
there are many differences that a judge might find between suing a local
11. This mediator's orientation certainly supports the view that lawyers as a group tend to be
adversarial and need to acquire a different mindset when mediating. Law tends to be the controlling
factor for them. Riskin, supra note 30, at 43-44.
112. Litigants often fail to understand the limited relief available in small claims court.
113. Under prevailing ethical standards, the mediator should have advised the claimant to consult
with an attorney. See infra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
114. The mediator's behavior is consistent with the view that all mediators apply pressure to
achieve specific results. See Matz, supra note 32, at 360. Ironically, in this case the pressure was not
in favor of, but against settlement.
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entity such as the Port Authority, and suing a private community cen-
ter.1 5 But the unrepresented claimant did not understand the legal
nuances. Relying on the mediator's legal opinion," 6 disguised as an
analogy, she concluded that she was not going to recover anything through
settlement and decided to "try her luck" with the judge.
The mediator reported little interaction with the defendant beyond
acknowledging his "no liability" claim. She seemed to agree with his
position that because the center was a public place and because he posted
signs disclaiming liability, he would never be held liable to the claimant.
Their mutual interpretation of the law aborted the mediation process. 17
Both in her initial screening, and continuing throughout the mediation
session, the mediator concluded that the claimant had no case: "Given the
facts as I understood them, I saw no way of settling the case . . .. In
situations like the one presented here, there is obviously not going to be a
settlement .... ." In short, as far as the mediator was concerned, the cards
were stacked in favor of the defendant."n
The mediator's exclusive focus on the legal merits of this case blocked
her vision to other values which could have contributed to a mutually
beneficial resolution, or at least brought greater understanding between the
parties. 9 She could have empathized with the defendant's concerns
about unlimited liability, but still have discussed the benefits of settle-
ment. ° Did the defendant understand that reaching a private resolution
through the mediation process might have ultimately been more beneficial
to him than "winning" at a trial, where there would be public acknowledge-
ment that people could have their property stolen, without recourse, at his
115. In addition to the problem of bias, see Note, supra note 72, at 1889, a mediator who gives
legal advice may be exposed to liability if the advice is incorrect. See ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note
51, ch. 11.
116. For a discussion of professional standards regarding the propriety of a mediator giving legal
advice, see infra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
117. The mediator's and defendant's interpretation of the law is not necessarily the correct one and
might be at odds with a judge's view of this case. A court might find that the center, as a public
establishment, had an affirmative duty to warn the claimant about the possibility of theft.
118. It is difficult to understand how the mediator could know with such certainty that there would
not be a settlement. Even if her interpretation of the law were correct, a settlement could still be
possible. Knowing that they must return to court one or two additional times for a trial, some parties
might prefer to make the case go away and settle for nuisance value.
119. Also, the mediator's "control" mindset, naifiely, that she saw "no way of settling the case,"
impedes parties from more active involvement.
120. Statistics suggest that plaintiffs generally win in small claims court. See Best et al., supra note
102, at 344.
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community center? How would this have affected the center's reputation
and future business? The mediator could have explored whether the center
was insured against theft, and if the defendant was unable or unwilling to
give the claimant monetary damages, perhaps he could have offered her
free tickets to upcoming events, or even an apology.' None of this
happened because the mediator assumed that without a "legal case," there
could be no settlement.
C. Law as Activated by the Players
The promise of individualized justice in court mediation includes the
possibility that parties may consider relevant principles of law in choosing
an outcome. Under current court mediation practices, however, the manner
in which law is acknowledged or ignored depends upon the parties' and the
mediator's legal knowledge, and the mediator's approach to facilitating the
process. These variables are interrelated. The parties' legal knowledge is
usually dependent upon legal representation.'22 The mediator's legal
knowledge typically depends upon whether the mediator is a lawyer. 23
However, the actual role of law in court mediation is measured not by legal
knowledge, but by the mediator's philosophical approach to the pro-
cess.
2 4
Consider the application of these variables to the Health Club case. The
mediator, a third-year law student, knew only some of the law relevant to
the claim. 25 This knowledge served as an uncomfortable reminder to her
of what a court might have done if the case were adjudicated. Nevertheless,
she dismissed the law's relevance to the resolution of this dispute. Why?
121. In my experience with small claims court mediation, apologies are usually well-received.
122. Of course, there are some unrepresented parties who will know the law, e.g., "repeat players"
and parties who themselves are lawyers. It is not entirely clear, however, that the knowledge provided
by legal representation would inform the parties' choice of outcome in mediation. See Marc Galanter
& Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 1339, 1385-86 (1994) (arguing that "'repeat players' will have a richer and more nuanced grasp
of relevant precedents than occasional or 'one shot' participants").
123. I realize that nonlawyer mediators may have abundant legal knowledge in specific substantive
areas of law. For example, court personnel who mediate on a regular basis in Small Claims Court and
in Housing Court often have legal expertise in housing or consumer law.
124. See supra notes 93-99, 111-21 and accompanying text. Using Professor Bush's examples, the
"protection-of-rights" mediator would tell the law; the "empowerment-and-recognition" mediator would
not. Bush, supra note 33, at 261, 283. See also William M. O'Barr, Juju Atkinson: Blurring the
Distinction Between Mediation and Adjudication, in WHEN TALK WORKs, supra note 23, at 359-72.
125. The mediator knew, for example, that misrepresentation could result in rescission of the
contract. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. Even if the mediator were a lawyer, however, she
might not have been aware of the provision for treble damages.
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Because in her view, the parties' need to end their business relationship
was more compelling than their interest in receiving a decision about who
was right or wrong. The defendant's lawyer, on the other hand, probably
negotiated with awareness of all the relevant law. Without a doubt, he
knew that if he failed to reach a settlement in mediation, his client would
be exposed to treble damages in court under the Health Club Services Law.
This legal knowledge probably informed and motivated his decision to
settle with the claimant for $200.00 and terminate the contract. Finally, the
claimant, who sought justice through law, presumably knew the least about
the law. 6 This may explain his apparent satisfaction with the $200.00
settlement.
In contrast to the Health Club case, law wielded a greater influence in
the Stolen Purse case, where the mediator and the defendant were stuck on
the lack of a legal remedy. Their mutual fixation with legal remedies
paralyzed the mediation process. The unrepresented claimant wanted to
know more about the law as she asked the mediator for legal advice.
Ultimately, the law as interpreted by the mediator, and indirectly communi-
cated to the claimant, convinced the claimant to abandon mediation and try
her "luck" with the judge. 2 7
Law, therefore, is not self-executing in court mediation. It is activated by
the players: both the parties and the mediator have to know about relevant
law in the first instance, decide what it means, and finally, decide whether
to embrace or ignore it. Whether law influences the outcome may well
depend upon the mediator's approach to the process. 2 1 Unless the
mediator's dominant approach is adjusted by the parties or their lawyers,
there is a strong probability that the individual mediator will determine the
influence of law in the mediation process.1 29 Thus, if justice has anything
to do with making knowledgeable choices based on an understanding of
relevant law, 3 ' then under current court mediation practices, justice is
126. The mediator was likewise ignorant of the Health Club Services Law, but given her decision
to exclude the law of misrepresentation from the mediation discussion, it is doubtful that she would
have been any more interested in, or willing to discuss, this specific consumer protection statute.
127. Given the varied approaches among judges in the informal courts, the claimant was indeed
correct in her quest for "luck" with the judge. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
128. In the words of one court mediation consumer, "[p]erhaps mediation is a crapshoot and
depends entirely on who is assigned to mediate." Clark, supra note 36, at 15.
129. Disregarding the law, as in the Health Club case, and focusing on the law, as in the Stolen
Purse case, are distinct approaches to court mediation.
130. As I discuss later in this article, justice has everything to do with such a decision making
process. See infra notes 174-216 and accompanying text.
1996]
76 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
serendipitous, depending upon which mediator a disputant draws. The two
case studies show the dangers of both ignorance of the law and over-
reliance on it. The immediate consequence of ignoring relevant law, as
demonstrated in the Health Club Case, is that the result may not be fair
because law provides greater relief. I do not suggest that the result is unfair
simply because it is incongruent with the law.' It is unfair because the
claimant had no knowledge of his possible right to collect treble damages
when he decided to settle for $200.00. On the other hand, over-reliance on
law may yield a result like that in the Stolen Purse case, where the
mediator's perception of what law would allow prevented settlement'32
and the parties never experienced the benefits of mediation.'
The case studies in the preceding sections raise uncomfortable questions
about the quality ofjustice available in court mediation. Some litigants who
seek justice through law may reach an agreement in mediation based. on a
fundamental understanding of law.'34 Other litigants will mediate and
reach agreements in ignorance of law. Thus, under current practices, the
influence of law on court mediation is, at best, unpredictable in any given
case. In my view, this imbalance has significant implications for the
ultimate fairness of court mediation. This is not just a question of the
"haves" versus the "have-nots." Rather, it is a question that relates to the
fundamental fairness of court-instituted procedures that purport to deliver
justice. It is also a question that suggests that the story of court mediation
today is really a story about hit-or-miss justice.
In Part III, I explore current views about the relationship between law
and mediation as expressed in both the literature and in existing mediation
statutes. Further, I demonstrate some of the weaknesses in the regulatory
structure of existing mediation statutes.
131. Of course, as legal realists remind us, rules of law do not decide cases. KARL N. LLEWELLYN,
THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY, 65-66 (1960); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path
of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457,461 (1897); C. Kaufrnan, The Scientific Method in Legal Thought:
Legal Realism and the Fourteen Principles of Justice, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 77, 78 (1980).
132. This supports the view that there is a danger of bias when mediators are allowed to give legal
assistance. See Note, supra note 72, at 1889.
133. See supra notes 31-36, 48 and accompanying text.
134. This is so even though they may choose to disregard the provisions of law.
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III. MEDIATION AND LAW-THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK
A. The Critical View
Conversations about the appropriate role of law in mediation are
dominated by criticism that law is excluded from mediation and predictions
about the consequences which flow from this exclusion."' Mediation, as
a constitutive part of the ADR movement, is susceptible to some of the
recurring objections to ADR: it fails to protect public values,'36 represents
inferior justice for poor people, 37 and forgoes several constitutional
rights.13 9
Some commentators fear that in the privatization of justice inherent in
ADR processes, the value of law is lost.'39 Others worry that "ADR will
replace the rule of law with nonlegal values."'"4 Critics generally compare
135. See, e.g., CHRISTINE B. HARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE: THE IDEOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONAL-
IZATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO COURT (1985); Grillo, supra note 58. However, not all commentators
agree that law is excluded from the settlement process. Professor Menkel-Meadow argues:
[I]t is important to observe here that settlements are affected by precedent-both in the ratio
decidendi of arriving at particular solutions and in the creation of new precedents. Precedent
makes its voice heard and power felt in every settlement, if only because one reason the
parties may choose to settle is to avoid the effects of previous lawmaking.
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 41, at 2680.
136. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL.
L. REV. 1, 17 (1987); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073, 1085 (1984); David
Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619 (1995); Judith Resnik,
Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 494, 553-54 (1986). But see
Barbara A. Phillips & Anthony C. Piazza, The Role of Mediation in Public Interest Disputes, 34
HASTINGS LJ. 1231, 1238 (1983) (observing that in litigation, the parties "may never address many of
the real interests involved in the dispute" and thus, mediation may be preferable to litigation in
environmental impact cases). Phillips and Piazza claim that in the context of public interest disputes,
the failure to use mediation is "a lost opportunity for mutual education, for building consensus." Id. at
1240.
137. See, e.g., Larry R. Spain, Alternative Dispute Resolution for the Poor: Is It an Alternative? 70
N.D. L. REv. 269, 273 (1994) (discussing possible disadvantages of ADR use by the poor).
138. See Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The Constitutional
Issues, 68 OR. L. REV. 487 (1989) (analyzing limits placed by the constitutional rights to trial by jury,
due process, and equal protection on mandatory ADR programs).
139. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 136, at 1085. See also Ingleby, supra note 58, at 450-51. See
generally Luban, supra note 136. Cf. Jules Coleman & Charles Silver, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 102, 104,
106-08 (1986) (arguing that trials offer advantages that cannot be obtained through settlement).
140. Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARv. L. REV.
668, 677 (1986). Edwards finds some mediation troubling because, while it increases settlement of
cases, "we have no satisfactory explanation as to why there may have been a variance from the rule of
law." Id. at 678.
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mediation unfavorably to adjudication, a process in which law plays a
predominant role.' 4' They find mediation inherently vulnerable because
it operates outside the protections of the formal legal system.' 42 Somehow
mediation implies a loss in securing all that the law promises. t4a
Some feminist scholars have criticized mediation for its potentially
threatening assault on women's rights, and argue that disadvantaged groups
may be the most vulnerable in mediation.'" Likewise, critical legal
scholars and critical race scholars have also criticized the threat to legal
rights inherent in alternative dispute resolution processes.' 41 The recurring
141. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 372 (1978)
(stating that "courts are essential to the 'rule of law").
142. See Nader, supra note 58, at 12 ("Mandatory mediation abridges American freedom because
it is often outside the law, eliminates choice ofprocedure, removes equal protection before an adversary
law, and is generally hidden from view."); see also Laura Nader, Trading Justice for Harmony, NIDR
F., Winter 1992, at 12 ("[T]he legal problems that need creative new forms of administration ofjustice
are those between people of unequal power.'),
143. See Sally E. Merry, The Social Organization of Mediation in Nonindustrial Societies:
Implications for Informal Community Justice in America, in 2 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 17,
39 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982) (questioning the quality of justice in the mediation programs of some
citizen dispute resolutions centers). But see Thomas Christian, Community Dispute Resolution: First-
Class Process or Second-Class Justice?, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 771, 779 (1986)
("Mediation is a first-class process that provides first-class justice.').
144. See, e.g., Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power,
40 BUFF. L. REv. 441, 523 (1992); Linda K. Girdner, Custody Mediation in the United States:
Empowerment or Social Control?, 3 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 134, 152-54 (1989); Grillo, supra note 58,
at 1549-50; Carol Lefcourt, Women, Mediation and Family Law, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 266,267-69
(1984); Regehr, supra note 22, at 362; Laurie Woods, Mediation: A Backlash to Women's Progress on
Family Law Issues, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 431, 435-36 (1985). 1 note that "law" and the legal
system have also failed to protect battered women even with orders of protection. Both the law and the
legal system must do more in these very serious situations. See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse,
Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decision Making, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727,
766-67 (1988) (noting that joint custody through mediation sometimes leads to wife abuse); Barbara
J. Hart, Gentle Jeopardy: The Further Endangerment of Battered Women and Children in Custody
Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 317, 318-25 (1990); Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of WfeAbuse Cases: The
Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 72 (1984)
(discussing criticisms of mediation as a remedy for wife abuse); Penny L. Willrich, Resolving the Legal
Problems of the Poor: A Focus on Mediation in Domestic Relations Cases, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
1373, 1377 (1989) ("In the domestic violence situation, mediation has been deemed dangerous for the
battered woman, because neither good faith nor equality of bargaining power exists in a battering
relationship.").
145. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, The Contradictions of Informal Justice, in I THE POLITICS OF
INFORMAL JUSTICE 267, 270-71 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982) (observing that informal justice can "extend
the ambit" and disguises the presence of state control); Richard Delgado et al., Fairness andFormality:
Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 1359, 1400
(concluding from social science studies of bias that the informality of ADR tends to increase prejudice
toward minority disputants). See also Susan Silbey & Austin Sarat, Dispute Processing In Law and
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theme in critical scholarly literature is that law should play a more
dominant role in the mediation process. 46 Among mediation practitioners,
however, there is no consensus on this issue.1 47
B. Legal Assistance
1. The Current Debate
Given the lack of consensus about the role of law in mediation, it is not
surprising that there is considerable debate about the propriety of mediators
giving legal assistance.141 Complicating the debate is the uncertain
application of the unauthorized practice of law doctrine149 and the related
question of whether mediation is the practice of law.' With respect to
lawyer-mediators, Professor Leonard Riskin suggests that one of the chief
values in choosing a lawyer as a mediator is the lawyer's "ability to tell the
participants what the law provides" and predict a probable court out-
come."' Professor Riskin would permit attorney mediators to give
impartial legal information, but he would require them to advise the parties
Legal Scholarship: From Institutional Critique to the Reconstruction of the Juridical Subject, 66 DENV.
U. L. REV. 437 (1989).
146. See, eg., Judith L. Maute, Mediator Accountability: Responding to Fairness Concerns, 1990
J. DISP. RESOL. 347 [hereinafter Maute, Mediator Accountability]; Judith L. Maute, Public Values and
Private Justice: A Case for Mediator Accountability, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503, 533-34 (1991)
[hereinafter Maute, Public Values].
147. See, e.g., Lande, supra note 27, at 37 (stating that "mediators vary widely on what is the
proper role of law in mediation"); Ellen Waldman, The Role of Legal Norms in Divorce Mediation: An
Argument for Inclusion, 1 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 87, 96-101 (1993) (presenting several opinions
concerning the use and relevance of legal norms in divorce mediation).
148. In this article, the term "legal assistance" includes both legal information and legal advice.
149. This doctrine generally restricts the practice of law to licensed attorneys. Several professional
ethics opinions have discussed the application of this doctrine in the context of divorce mediation. For
a general discussion of the doctrine as it applies to mediation, see ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 51,
§ 10:05.
150. Of course, if mediation were the practice of law, then non-lawyers would generally be
excluded from practicing it. A recent amendment to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
regarding "law-related services" by lawyers makes conflict of interest rules applicable to mediation. See
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.7(b) (1994); ABA COMM. ON ANCILLARY BUSINESS,
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 5 (1994). See also Bruce E. Meyerson,
New ABA Rule Affects Lawyer-Mediators, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Summer 1994, at 7; New Jersey Supreme
Court Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics Op. No. 676 (1994) (providing that mediation is the
practice of law).
151. Riskin, supra note 35, at 351. Riskin, writing chiefly in the context of divorce mediation,
acknowledges, however, that "such neutral lawyering is unusual, problematical, and perhaps even
dangerous if not conducted carefully." Id.
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about the risks involved in such an endeavor.'52 Professor Judith Maute
offers that where parties are unrepresented, mediators should be required
to tell them enough about the law to adequately inform their settlement
decisions.'53 Litigants would then "knowingly and voluntarily agree to
deviate from the probable litigated outcome."'' "
The counterarguments suggest that giving legal assistance goes beyond
the role of the mediator.'55 Dean James Alfini argues that parties would
consider the mediator's advice authoritative, and this would threaten party
self-determination.'56 Likewise, Professor Robert Baruch Bush suggests
that it may be preferable to separate the functions of lawyer as mediator
152. Riskin, supra note 30, at 40. Riskin was agreeing with the approach taken by the Oregon bar
ethics committee in an opinion on divorce mediation, which allowed legal advice in the presence of
both parties, but required the mediator to tell the parties to seek independent legal counsel before
executing the agreement. Id. (citing Oregon Bar Assoc., Opinions, No. 79-46 (proposed 1980)). In a
later article, Professor Riskin stated that he would allow mediators to define legal issues without
applying the law directly. Riskin, supra note 35, at 336.
A number of other commentators support various types of legal assistance. See, e.g., Richard E.
Crouch, Divorce Mediation and Legal Ethics, 16 FAM. L.Q. 219, 249 (1982) ("A party who objects to
the lack of private legal advice will be informed of its availability from independent legal counsel
unconnected with the mediation.... Legal advice will be given to the parties only in the presence of
each other."); Andrew J. Pine, The Lawyer as Mediator.- Professional Responsibility Problems or
Profession Problems?, 63 CAN. B. REV. 378 (1985); Sandra E. Pumell, Comment, The Attorney as
Mediator-Inherent Conflict of Interest?, 32 UCLA L. Rnv. 986, 1008 (1985) ("In disputes with
important legal dimensions, a legally trained mediator can contribute to effective decision making by
providing the parties with fair, accurate, and impartial information.'); cf Rosenberg, supra note 42, at
487 ("The fact that a mediator might explain to parties what the law directs a court to do is not a reason
to condemn the process of mediation.").
153. See Maute, Mediator Accountability, supra note 146, at 366. In a later article, Professor Maute
contends that proposed Model Rule 2.4 should govem the conduct of lawyers who mediate. Maute,
Public Values, supra note 146, at 514. Part of the rule provides: "When the parties are not separately
represented, the mediator should provide them with sufficient information about the law and its possible
application so that each party can make adequately informed decisions. Explanation of the applicable
law shall occur in the presence of both parties to the mediation." Id. (citing MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 2.4(b) (1983)).
154. Maute, Mediator Accountability, supra note 146, at 366.
155. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Quiet Revolution Comes to Kentucky: A Case Study In
Community Mediation, 81 KY. L.J. 855, 899 (1992-93) (stating that "mediators... are obliged not to
provide legal advice').
To the extent that giving legal advice removes the cloak of neutrality from the mediator, Professor
Joseph Stulberg would argue against it. See Stulberg, supra note 22, at 86; see also Note, supra note
72, at 1889 (arguing that allowing mediators to comment on the law invites personal bias).
156. Alfini & Clay, supra note 94, at 8. Alfini and Clay summarize the arguments against giving
legal advice: the mediator may give the wrong information; there is a lack of certainty as to what a
court will actually do; legal assistance usually advantages one party over the other, and the legal
profession may exercise too much control over the process to the disadvantage of nonlawyer mediators.
Id.
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from lawyer as dispenser of legal information and advice.'57
The legal advice discussion becomes more critical as court mediation
programs increase, 5 ' particularly when unrepresented parties are in-
volved. 5 9 These are the most vulnerable players because many of them
do not even know what questions to ask of the mediator, let alone make
informed decisions about their legal rights.60 Ultimately, however, the
question of whether mediators should give legal assistance depends upon
an understanding of the more fundamental question of what court mediation
can be expected to accomplish. 6'
2. Ethical Standards
In existing professional and ethical standards regarding the role of law
in mediation, law is separated out into categories related to legal informa-
tion and legal advice, with different consequences attached to each
classification.'62 Mediators are generally cautioned not to offer legal
advice, but instead to refer parties to independent legal counsel.'63 The
consensus from existing standards is that even when the lawyer-mediator
does provide legal assistance, the parties should still be advised to obtain
independent legal counsel.'
157. According to Bush: "Mediation might fare better if lawyer-mediators simply set aside their
substantive legal knowledge and use their professional training instead as a 'skills bank' for effective
mediator strategies, leaving the business of legal information and advice to lawyers operating as such,
either inside or outside the mediation room." Bush, supra note 33, at 280 n.75.
158. See supra notes 45-75 and accompanying text.
159. Like the claimants in the two case studies, the majority of small claims litigants are not
represented by lawyers. In many states, small claims court procedures exclude lawyers from
participating on the theory that this is contrary to the role of the small claims court as a people's court.
See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-512(B) (1990); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-6-407(2) (West
1989); IDAHO CODE § 1-2308 (1990 & Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 61-2707(a) (1994); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.8408(1) (West 1987 & Supp. 1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2803(2) (1989
& Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 55.090(1) (1993). Should the same rationale apply in mediation
where the parties have no real right of appeal?
160. See BUSH, supra note 96, at 15, reprinted in 1994 J. DiSP. RESOL. at 21.
161. See infra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
162. As a general rule, legal information is permitted, but legal advice is not. Robert B. Moberly,
Ethical Standards for Court-Appointed Mediators and Florida's Mandatory Mediation Experiment, 21
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 701, 714 (1994).
163. This is generally referred to as the "independent counsel rule." For representative rules and
standards, see appendix. Under this rule, parties cannot be required to obtain independent legal counsel
but may be advised of the risk of proceeding without it. Emily Kofron, Remaking the Philosophical
Map? New Rules for Attorney Mediators, J. KAN. B. ASS'N, April 1989, at 21, 25.
164. See, e.g., Comm. on Professional Ethics of the Florida Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 86-8 (1992)
(providing that lawyer-mediators should explain risks of proceeding without independent legal counsel).
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3. Unrepresented Parties
The standard response to the plight of unrepresented parties is similar:
A mediator should warn unrepresented parties of the dangers of proceeding
without legal counseqt 65 or adyise them to obtain independent coun-
sel. 6 The "independent counsel" rule is a woefully inadequate response
to the problem of unrepresented parties in court mediation. Lack of access
to the courts is a pervasive problem in the United States,'67 with less than
half of moderate and low income families using the justice system to
resolve their legal problems.'68 Despite the increased interest in manda-
tory pro bono service by the bar, vast segments of the American public are
The proposed Joint Standards of the ABA, AAA, and SPIDR do not specifically address the role
of law in mediation. Mediators are simply urged to refrain from providing professional advice and,
instead, advise parties to seek outside professional help or choose another method of dispute resolution.
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT, supra note 8, app. c at 272.
The ABA Standards of Practice for Lawyer Mediators in Family Disputes, approved in 1984, permit
mediators to "define the legal issues," but not advise the parties based on the mediator's understanding
of the legal situation. AMERICAN BAR ASs'N, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYER MEDIATORS IN
FAMILY DISPUTES standard IV(C) (1984), reprinted in GOLDBERG, supra note 45, at 472. Instead, the
mediator is advised to recommend to the parties that they obtain independent legal counsel so that they
can obtain a "sufficient understanding of appropriate statutory and case law as well as local judicial
tradition, before reaching an agreement." Id. At least seven times throughout the ABA standards,
mediators are advised to recommend that parties consult independent legal counsel. Id. at 469-74. State
professional responsibility codes and court rules governing family mediation practice echo similar
themes. See, e.g., IOWA RULES GOVERNING STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYER MEDIATORS IN
FAMILY DISPUTES Rule 4(B) (providing that a mediator shall "recommend expert or legal consultation
in the event it appears that additional knowledge or understanding is necessary for balanced negotia-
tions"); KAN. Sup. CT. R. 901(b)(3) (stating that an attomey-mediator must advise parties to seek
independent legal advice before executing any settlement agreement); OREGON CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-106 (1986), reprinted in GOLDBERG, supra note 45, at 322-23 ("A lawyer serving
as a mediator may draft a settlement agreement but must advise and encourage the parties to seek
independent legal advice before executing it.').
165. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572.35(1) (West 1988).
166. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-603(a)(5) (1988).
167. See also Podgers, supra note 4, at 56 (describing the struggle to provide equal justice for all
Americans due to lack of access to the justice system for those who cannot afford to pay); Spain, supra
note 137, at 270 (noting that the poor have not had equal access to the legal system). See generally
CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERV. AND THE PUBLIC, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, CIVIL JUSTICE: AN AGENDA
FOR THE 1990s (Esther F. Lardent ed., 1991) [hereinafter CIVIL JUSTICE]; COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID,
N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, THE NEW YORK LEGAL NEEDS STUDY(1993).
168. ROY W. REESE & CAROLYN A. ELDRED, INSTITUTE FOR SURVEY RESEARCH AT TEMPLE
UNIV., FINDINGS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 19-21 (1994). A major aspect of legal
services work is turning away clients who have important legal problems which should be managed by
lawyers. Zulack, supra note 34, at 633.
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unable to afford lawyers for their most basic legal problems. 69 It is not
just poor, but also moderate income 70 and middle class Americans who
are affected.17' The independent counsel rule is a particularly illusory
concept for litigants in the informal courts whose initial attraction was the
promise of a people's court where lawyers would be unnecessary.1 72
Thus, the response of existing professional mediation standards to the
problem of unrepresented litigants, while theoretically attractive, is
practically unfeasible for the majority of Americans. It is unlikely that those
who cannot afford to hire lawyers to access the legal system will now be
able to afford lawyers to counsel them in court mediation.173
169. See CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERV. AND THE PUBLIC, AMERICAN BAR AsS'N, LEGAL
SERVICES FOR THE AVERAGE CITIzEN (1977); Douglas S. Eakeley, Background Paper, in A LAWYER
AT A PRICE PEOPLE CAN AFFORD: EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW CONFERENCE (1975); Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., et al., Why Lawyers Should be Allowed to Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services,
58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084, 1088-1094 (1984) (explaining that prices for legal services are subject to
market forces); Deborah Chalfie, Break the Lawyers'Legal Advice Monopoly, NEWSDAY, Dec. 3, 1989,
at 4 (noting studies that show low- and middle-income people being "shut out of America's legal
system" because they cannot afford lawyers); Susan Freinkel, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do, RECORDER,
Nov. 2, 1992, at I (discussing the increase in number of litigants without lawyers in California courts).
170. Gerry Singsen, Legal Clinics and Access to Justice, in CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 167, at 77,
80.
171. Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570, 574
(1983); Robert W. Meserve, Our Forgotten Client: The Average American, 57 A.B.A. J. 1092 (1971);
John S. Dzienkowski, The Regulation of the American Legal Profession and Its Reform, 68 TEx. L.
REV. 451,454-55 (1989) (book review) ("The poor and middle classes continue to experience problems
in obtaining access to legal services."); cf. JONATHAN B. MARKS ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
AMERICA: PROCESSES IN EVOLUTION 17 (1984) (noting that the cost of attorney fees is one factor that
prevents many middle-class citizens from access to the courts); Cyril A. Fox, Jr., Comment, Providing
Legal Services for the Middle Class in Civil Matters: The Problem, the Duty and a Solution, 26 U.
PIrr. L. REV. 811, 812 (1965) (noting that the increasing demand for legal guidance will come from
the "'forgotten middle income class,' who can neither afford to pay proportionately large fees nor
qualify for ultra-low-cost services.").
172. For an alternative critique of the independent counsel rule, see Pirie, supra note 152, at 400-01
(claiming that the independent counsel rule threatens trust in the mediator).
Other commentators have noted that some mediators object to the notion of independent legal
review, fearing that lawyers' self-interest will cause them to reject the mediation agreement in favor of
litigation. See SUSAN M. LEESON & BRYAN M. JOHNSTON, ENDING IT: DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
AMERICA 140 (1988).
173. The sad reality of so many Americans without legal services has prompted calls for some form
of deregulation of the practice of law. See Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law:
Do Good Fences Really Make Good Neighbors-Or Even Good Sense?, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
159, 159-60; Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical
Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 97-98 (1981); Meredith A. Munro,
Note, Deregulation of the Practice of Law: Panacea or Placebo?, 42 HASTINGS L.J 203 (1990).
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IV. JUSTICE IN COURT MEDIATION
The search for justice through law is suspended in court mediation. The
search for justice in court mediation must begin, therefore, with a
conceptual understanding of what court mediation is expected to accom-
plish. This calls for a clear understanding of the nature of court mediation
and of the mediator's role in that process.
A. Court Mediation-The Face of Equity
What is it that distinguishes court mediation from other docket-clearing
processes? 74 I suggest that beneath the surface of settlement ideology,
there is a deeper level of motivation that can and should inform
decisionmaking in court mediation. This motivation is an equitable
perspective that supplements the rigidity that often accompanies the
application of legal principles to human conflict.
The equitable perspective first affirms the humanity of the opposing
party before deciding how to negotiate with that person as an "opponent."
Operating within the framework of an equitable perspective, a mediated
settlement, if it occurs, is not solely a legal or economic'75 decision but
a human one that takes into account basic fairness, interpersonal relation-
ships, and numerous intangible interests, 76 such as the need for an
apology, venting, and acknowledgment of human dignity. 77 This, the
face of equity in court mediation, 7 1 captures the human elements often
174. For example, what distinguishes court mediation from judicial settlement conferences? For a
discussion of these types of conferences, see Robert C. Zampano, Judicially Supervised Settlement
Conferences, in GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS GROUP, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: A HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 12 (Philip J. Harter ed., 1991).
175. For a review of the economic literature on settlement, see Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067
(1989). See generally Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991).
176. Cases often settle for reasons other than legal or economic ones. See, e.g., Galanter & Cahill,
supra note 122.
177. The equitable perspective in court mediation may not necessarily result in the transformation
envisioned by Professors Bush and Folger. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 25, at 20-22.
178. A deeper analysis of the intangible values of court mediation may suggest a parallel with some
of the moral values underlying historic equity practice. These values underlie equitable maxims such
as the clean hands doctrine, equitable estoppel, and the idea that litigants should do justice if they seek
justice. See WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAx, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 39,41 (2d ed. 1956). However,
despite some of the parallels between court mediation and historic equity practice, to date, court
mediation lacks any general principles ofjurisdiction. Equity, for example, would act only if the remedy
at law were inadequate. Court mediation contains no such limitations.
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concealed behind the "masks of the law."' 79
It is in its commitment to an equitable perspective that court mediation
is-or ought to be-distinguishable from other types of settlement
negotiations. Such a commitment, however, does not preclude the presence
of legal knowledge. Law must supplement and inform the equitable
perspective in court mediation. For, just as Maitland observed that "[e]quity
without common law would have been a castle in the air, an impossibili-
ty,"'80 I argue that court mediation without knowledge of law offers
simply the illusion of justice. Unless bargaining is informed by knowledge
of law,' justice in court mediation is also a "castle in the air."
B. Evaluating Justice in Court Mediation
1. Inadequacy of Prevailing Criteria
As I suggested earlier in this article, most litigants come to court seeking
justice through law. Unless they decide to settle, 182 they will receive a
public outcome in court which is reviewable through the appellate process.
In providing the alternative of mediation, courts offer litigants the possibil-
ity of a creative and private outcome based on "individualized justice."' 83
How should this be evaluated?
84
Under prevailing criteria, mediation is evaluated generally in terms of
self-determination, participant satisfaction, and efficiency. As applied to
court mediation, these criteria may be useful indicators for evaluating pro-
cess, but are less helpful when evaluating outcome. These criteria tell us
only that litigants were doing something, that they felt good about it, and
that dockets were cleared as a result.'85 They tell us little about whether
179. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES,
JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS 19-21 (1976).
180. F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: A COURSE OF LECTURES 19 (revised by John Brunyate, 1949).
181. See infra notes 209-16 and accompanying text.
182. I note that litigants may be pressured into settlement by court personnel, so that the "decision
to settle" may not be an entirely voluntary one.
183. This may or may not approximate the "shadow verdict" defined by Luban as "the anticipated
result of a fair trial." Luban, supra note 6, at 400.
184. Several commentators have written about criteria for evaluating the justice of ADR. See, e.g.,
Brunet, supra note 136, at 8-9; Luban, supra note 6, at 401-03; cf, Richard A. Posner, The Summary
Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53
U. CH. L. REV. 366 (1986).
185. In the Supreme Court, Civil Branch of New York County, there are over 44,000 cases pending
in which there has been a request for judicial intervention. Over 7300 of these cases are ready for trial.
Telephone Interview with John Werner, Chief Clerk and Executive Officer of the Supreme Court, Civil
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litigants actually knew what they were doing or why they were doing it.
Thus, these criteria tell us little about justice in court mediation.
2. Confronting the Limits of Individualized Justice
The appealing rhetoric of mediation suggests that "individualized justice"
is a good thing.186 The familiar story goes something like this: Mediation
is the end product of autonomous parties mutually exercising self-
determination. The parties who are personally affected by a dispute decide
the outcome of that dispute. They personally invest in the process and have
ultimate control over the outcome. Their participation and power result in
enormous satisfaction with the mediation process and ultimately, in a high
degree of compliance with mediation agreements." 7
While the above-described process seems wonderful, there are danger
zones in this idealized world. Take satisfaction, for example. Certainly, it
is important that parties be satisfied with court mediation, but should it be
the sole criteria for measuring justice? If my opponent sues me for one
thousand dollars and I settle in mediation by paying him one hundred
dollars, I might be personally quite satisfied. If I learned afterward,
however, that my opponent's claim was time barred, I might feel otherwise
about the result. Similarly, in the Health Club case, both the parties and the
mediator were personally satisfied with the outcome. In fact, we are told
that the claimant seemed very happy. However, if he had known about the
possibility of collecting treble damages (in that case about $900) from the
health club, would he still have been satisfied with two hundred dollars and
the ability to terminate the contract? And if the mediator knew about the
treble damages provision of the statute, would she still think that she "did
Branch, in New York County, N.Y. (July 25, 1995).
186. I realize that some commentators have argued for a more communitarian idea of mediation.
See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 25.
187. See supra note 36. The empirical studies showing high compliance rates with mediation
agreements and reports of user satisfaction are not surprising. After all, win or lose, parties in mediation
have control over the outcome. As in Rawls' gambling example, so long as the procedure is fair (i.e.,
bets are made voluntarily, no one cheats, etc.), and the procedure has been properly followed, then the
outcome is also fair (i.e., distribution of cash after the last bet is fair. Rawls gives this as an example
of pure procedural justice. See JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 86 (1971).
Empirical studies also point to the success of mediation programs based on the number of cases that
are settled. Mediation is viewed as a tool of good court management-the more cases that settle, the
more time judges will have for serious matters. Cleared dockets, however, are more a measure of
efficiency than justice. See supra note 36.
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okay" or would her initial ethical misgivings return to gnaw at her?'
Even mediation's most favored virtue, self-determination," 9 may be of
limited value as an indicator of the justice of court mediation. Without
knowledge of their legal rights, the exercise of self-determination is simply
a feel-good process. People are satisfied and sometimes even happy for
reasons that may have more to do with simply getting it over with than
satisfying their initial quest for justice through law.
3. Dangers for Unrepresented Parties
Court mediation without knowledge of legal rights has the capacity to
confuse, coerce, and mislead unrepresented parties. 9 ' In this regard, the
case of Wright v. Brockett 9' is even more instructive than the two case
studies discussed previously in this article."9 ' Wright involved a landlord-
tenant harassment dispute which was referred to a local dispute resolution
center by a Bronx criminal court. The dispute was allegedly resolved during
a mediation/arbitration session,193 with the seventy-four-year-old unrepre-
sented tenant agreeing, as part of the settlement, to vacate the apartment
where she had lived for nearly twenty years.' 94 Ultimately, the tenant
refused to vacate the apartment and the landlord brought an ejectment
action. 9 In seeking to set aside her settlement agreement, the tenant
argued that the agreement resulted from coercion, lack of legal representa-
188. David Luban suggests that participant satisfaction is an inadequate criterion for measuring
justice. He gives four reasons: (1) externality problems (i.e., one's happiness may cause another
individual's misery); (2) sour grapes and cooling out (i.e., participants' expectations may be
illegitimately lowered); (3) distributional insensitivity (i.e. "nonchalance about how satisfaction is
distributed among the parties"); and (4) informational poverty (i.e. lack of "information about resources,
their utilization, and the lives of the participants"). Luban, supra note 6, at 403-07.
189. See supra note 8.
190. Perhaps there is a parallel here to the relationship between equity and law. In this regard I note
Maitland's warning that while equity and law worked well together, "equity without common law had
the capacity to be unwieldy or chaotic." Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 1001 (1987).
191. 571 N.Y.S.2d 660 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991).
192. See supra notes 89-121 and accompanying text.
193. The combination of the mediation and arbitration processes, known as "med-arb," involves an
agreement by the parties "that a mediated agreement may be entered as an arbitration award, or if there
is a failure to agree, the matter may be referred to the arbitrator for a decision." 371 N.Y.S.2d at 663
(citing GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS GROUP, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, EXPANDING HORIZONS: THEORY AND
RESEARCH IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION 92-93 (Thomas F. Christian et al. eds., 1989).
194. 571 N.Y.S.2d at 661-62.
195. Id. The tenant first learned that the landlord's rental to her was in violation of the Housing
Code while this action was pending. Aff. in Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. for Payment of Use and Occupancy
at 3, Wright (No. 16904/89).
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tion, and the mediator's failure to explain her rights.'96 The court declined
to grant a judgment of ejectment, noting that the settlement agreement was
not "a provident decision by the tenant, free of coercion." 97
Have courts come full circle in Wright, referring parties to mediation and
then refusing to enforce agreements made in that process? This is certainly
a more dramatic case in terms of outcome than the two case studies
discussed earlier, and it rightfully deserved post-mediation attention by a
court. The consequences for the unrepresented, ailing, 9 ' and elderly
tenant in this mediation were severe-surrendering her home of twenty
years.' 99 Fortunately, this tenant was able to successfully challenge the
agreement. How many other unrepresented parties will have the same
ability?
It is one thing to extol the merits of autonomy in a voluntary setting
among equals when litigants have the power to choose freely the outcome
of a dispute. It is quite another to talk about it in a court setting where
parties may be required to participate and/or may be ignorant of the options
that would have been available had they been permitted to pursue their
original quest for justice through law. Presumably, parties who are repre-
sented by counsel are aware of their legal rights and are able to freely
choose the outcome of their dispute-the ultimate test for self-determina-
tion. However, what about unrepresented, unknowledgeable litigants? To
talk of autonomous decision making for them is not unlike the fiction of
incompetent patients exercising autonomy in medical decision making." °
196. 571 N.Y.S.2d at 662. In an affidavit submitted to the court in connection with this case, the
tenant stated: "The mediator did not discuss my rights in terms of my apartment nor was I told that I
need not agree to leave." Aff. in Opp'n to Pis.' Mot. for Order to Enforce IMCR Disp. Resol. Ctr.
Award at 2, Wright (No. 16904/89).
197. 571 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
198. The tenant claimed that she had several ailments, including high blood pressure and heart
problems. Aff. in Opp'n to Pis.' Mot. for Payment of Use and Occupancy at I, Wright (No. 16904/89).
199. If this tenant had found herself in Housing Court, rather than at a local mediation center, the
result may not have been much better. For a discussion of the plight of unrepresented tenants in New
York Housing Court, see 144 Woodruff Corp. v. Lacrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d 956 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1992)
(vacating stipulation signed by tenant who was not represented by counsel in a summary nonpayment
eviction proceeding). See also Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination
of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HoFSTRA L. REv. 533 (1992) (describing how
unrepresented tenants fared in a Baltimore housing court).
200. "[A]utonomy has long been the dominant rhetorical value in American medical law and
medical ethics." Roger B. Dworkin, Medical Law and Ethics in the Post-Autonomy Age, 68 IND. L.J.
727, 727 (1993).
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C. Goal of Court Mediation: Achieving the Equivalent of Justice
Through Law
Court is a forum where litigants expect to achieve justice through law.
For this reason, court mediation should be judged by a different standard
than noncourt mediation.
The fundamental questions about court mediation go well beyond the
individualized justice which finds expression in autonomy, self-determi-
nation, and feelings of satisfaction. They go well beyond administrative
efficiency and clearing dockets. Rather, the fundamental questions about
court mediation concern fairness.2"' What were the parties' reasonable
expectations when they brought their dispute into the legal system? Did
they achieve them in court mediation? The central inquiry in this analysis
is whether parties who initially sought justice through law in court
adjudication2 2 received the closest analogue to justice through law in
court mediation.2"3
What does it mean to achieve the equivalent of justice through law in
mediation? A "shadow verdict"?2°4 Litigants who leave court well-
201. As Judge Jon 0. Newman has observed, "[flaimess is the fundamental concept that guides our
thinking about substantive and procedural law. Fairness provides the measure by which we gauge the
virtues of familiar arrangements and the risks of innovation." Jon 0. Newman, Rethinking Fairness:
Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE L.J. 1643, 1646 (1985).
202. I include here both arbitration and judicial trials.
203. These questions also have a public dimension. We might ask, for example, whether the
public's interest in regulating health clubs was served by the mediated settlement in the Health Club
case. As discussed earlier, the purpose of the Health Club Services law is to protect the public against
unfair practices. See supra note 108. Thus, in the Health Club case, mediation allowed the health club
to avoid sanctions and nullified the remedial effect of the statute. If Fiss is right that "[the court's] job
is not to maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to explicate and give
force to the values embodied in authoritative texts," then the agreement reached in this case may fall
short of the mark. Fiss, supra note 136, at 1085.
The result in the Health Club case, however, is not surprising. It is consistent with the public policy
in favor of settlement. See Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary
System, 44 HASTINGS LJ. 1, 3 (1992) ("It is a truism that the law favors a policy of settlement and
compromise."). It is also not peculiar to mediated agreements. The same thing happens when courts
vacate their opinions at the parties' request, approve consent decrees, and encourage other types of
private settlements. For a criticism of this process, see Jill E. Fisch, Captive Courts: The Destruction
of Judicial Decisions by Agreement of the Parties, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 191 (1993); Jill E. Fisch,
Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior Decisional Law through Settlement and Vacatur,
76 CORNELL L. REv. 589 (1991); Jill E. Fisch, The Vanishing Precedent: Eduardo Meets Vacatur, 70
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 325 (1994). An extended analysis of the public interest question in court
mediation is beyond the scope of this article.
204. See Luban, supra note 6, at 400.
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satisfied? At a minimum, court mediation should produce what court
adjudication should produce---"just results at the end of just proceed-
ings."2 5 Procedurally, parties should experience the functional equivalent
of having their day in court.0 6 The outcome they achieve must be
voluntarily and knowledgeably chosen by them. This means that parties
participate in a process that allows them to negotiate from an equitable
perspective with knowledge of their legal rights.
Equivalency justice does not mirror the likely court outcome. Instead, it
responds to the parties' reasonable expectations: the fair result parties seek
in initially coming to court. Parties choose courts to resolve disputes
because they want what courts have to offer-dispute resolution based on
principles of law. To the extent that courts require parties to resolve
disputes differently through the mediation process, they should be able to
freely and consciously reject what the law has to offer.
D. Achieving Equivalency Justice in Court Mediation
1. The Principle of Self-Determination
The controlling principle of mediation is self-determination.2 7 Underly-
ing this notion is the fundamental ideal of autonomy, which has been a
longstanding principle in American jurisprudence.2 8 Whatever the merits
of extolling self-determination as a guiding principle for mediation
generally, its invocation in the context of court mediation is problematic on
two levels. First, it assumes that court mediation is just like other types of
205. I share the late Professor Maurice Rosenberg's view in this regard. See Maurice Rosenberg,
Resolving Disputes Differently: Adieu to Adversary Justice?, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 801, 809 (1988).
206. This means an opportunity to tell their story and be heard. Empirical studies on user
satisfaction suggest that parties do experience procedural fairness in court mediation. See supra note
36. A fair process, however, does not necessarily guarantee a fair outcome. See Cecilia Albin, The Role
of Fairness in Negotiation, 9 NEGOTIATION J. 223, 225-26 (1993).
207. But see BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 25, at 37 (observing that many practicing mediators "are
willing to be quite directive" in pursuit of their objective of achieving "good-quality settlements').
208. This is particularly true in the context of medical decision making. See Schloendorffv. Society
of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) ("Every human being of adult years and sound mind has
a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient's consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.'), overruled on
other grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
In addition to its presence in the common law theory of self-determination in the context of medical
decision making, autonomy has also been a predominant principle in right of privacy jurisprudence. This
is evidenced by the Supreme Court's acknowledgement of the right of privacy, described by Brandeis
as "the right to be let alone." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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mediation. Second, invoking self-determination as a controlling principle
says nothing about its operative effects in court mediation.
2. Prerequisite for Exercising Self-Determination in Court Mediation
Court mediation requires parties to place the locus of decision making
in themselves; to become active participants in the resolution of their own
disputes.2 9 In order to engage fully in this decisionmaking process,
disputants must be positioned to make conscious, informed choices. Thus,
knowledge of legal rights is a necessary prerequisite to the exercise of self-
determination in court mediation.21 Without such knowledge, the fairness
of the mediation process and its outcome are suspect.2 '
In arguing that conscious choice in court mediation requires relevant
legal knowledge, I am not suggesting that perfect knowledge is possi-
ble.2" However, uninformed self-determination is hollow. Parties in court
mediation who resolve disputes based on their ethics, culture, sense of
morality, personal fairness and the like, instead of law, should have
consciously chosen to disregard their legal rights.2"3 In order to achieve
the analogue to justice through law, parties must know their legal rights
before choosing to abandon them in mediation. In short, the exercise of
self-determination in mediation should be informed. For if the self is
unknowing, just what is it determining?
Presumably, parties represented by lawyers would have relevant legal
209. On the other hand, parties who seek a judge's decision based on the rule of law are generally
passive participants in the resolution of their legal disputes. Their participation, if any, occurs through
their attorneys.
210. The relationship between knowledge and self-determination raises jurisprudential inquiries
which are beyond the scope of this Article. I note, however, that this topic has been the subject of lively
debate by scholars. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Self-Realization, Democracy, and Freedom of
Expression: A Reply to Professor Baker, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 678, 682 (1982) ("[s]elf-rule is fostered
by the receipt of information that enables the individual to make life-affecting decisions in a more
informed fashion."); Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech
and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971); Martin H. Redish, The Value
of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982). But see C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization:
Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 646, 661
(1982) ("Self-rule and democracy can and do operate without full and complete information.")
211. I am aware, of course, that knowlege of legal rights does not guarantee fairness. Parties may
lack the resources to exercise their rights. This is particularly true in the informal courts.
212. Certainly court adjudication does not require parties to have perfect knowledge.
213. Professor Judith Maute argues that litigants should knowingly deviate from the probable court
outcome before making agreements in mediation. Maute, Mediator Accountability, supra note 146, at
360. However, assessing probable court outcome might be an impossible task in the informal courts
because of variances among individual judges. See RHUNKA ET AL., supra note 97, at 18-24, 34-38
(discussing the role and attitudes of small claims court judges).
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knowledge,2 4 but most unrepresented parties-a growing population
inside and outside the justice system-are at the "short end of the stick."
The unrepresented claimant in the Health Club case bargained "in the
dark,"215  while the represented defendant was presumably "in the
know." 6 They reached an agreement that probably complied with
mediation's goal of party self-determination, but we are left to ponder what
result might have been achieved if the claimant's exercise of self-determi-
nation had been more informed.
3. The Mediator's Role with Unrepresented Parties in Court
Despite the proliferation of mediation statutes in a wide range of subject
areas,217 little attention has been focused on unrepresented parties as an
21821identifiable group and on the mediator's responsibilities to them.21
The few rules and statutes that specifically refer to unrepresented parties
require that mediators encourage them to consult with independent legal
counsel." However, as discussed earlier in this article, the "independent
counsel" rule is an illusory concept for the majority of Americans who
214. But see Galanter & Cahill, supra note 122, at 1385-86 (discussing studies where lawyers had
difficulty understanding court standards and predicting court outcome).
215. The claimant was unaware of the serious consequences for the club if its actions were
construed not merely as a breach of promise, but as consumer fraud. Both the claimant and the mediator
were unaware of the private right of action created by the Health Club Services Law.
216. Presumably, the only player "in the know" here was the "tough" attomey for the health club,
who, as the mediation session progressed, became "understanding and amiable" and willing to talk
settlement.
217. See generally ROGERS AND MCEwEN, supra note 51, app. B.
218. The National Standards for Court-Connected Mediation offer three suggestions to mediators
when dealing with unrepresented parties:
Where one or more parties are unrepresented, mediators may reduce any actual or perceived
imbalance that results by any of the following means:
(1) Advising unrepresented parties of their right to have an attorney present and of possible
sources for obtaining legal representation.
(2) Maximizing the use of separate sessions, so that the unrepresented party will be less
intimidated and so that the mediator may spend additional time with the unrepresented party,
if necessary.
(3) As a last resort, the mediator may decide that the case is not appropriate for mediation.
NATIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 59, Standard 10.2 cmt.
219. One notable exception is in the area of mandatory divorce mediation. See Craig A. MeEwen
et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce
Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REv. 1317, app. at 1396 (1995).
220. See, e.g., DEL. SUPER. CT. Civ. INTERIM 1R 16,2 (i)(1994) ("Unrepresented parties to the
mediation are encouraged to consult with counsel prior to executing a mediation agreement.");
ALTERNATIVE Disp. RESOL. SEC., STATE BAR OF TEx., ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR MEDIATORS § 11,
cmt. b (1994) ("A mediator should explain generally to pro se parties that there may be risks in
proceeding without independent counsel or other professional advisors.').
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cannot afford lawyers."' Thus, there is no real system in place to protect
unrepresented parties in court mediation. Should court mediators protect
them?2'
There is considerable variance today in how mediators conceptualize
their role.' Moreover, much ink has been spilled by commentators who
also differ on this question. 4 The current divide lies somewhere between
the vision of a mediator as a "disinterested referee"' and as an "empow-
erment specialist."' 6 Locating the discussion within the context of court
mediation and the role of law raises significant policy questions for
unrepresented parties. 7 Should mediators guarantee a fair agreement?
Or, is it enough that the agreement be legal? What type of legal assistance,
if any, should mediators offer? Legal advice? Legal information? Even
221. See supra notes 166-73 and accompanying text.
222. This would require considerable legal expertise and could lead to a monopolization of court
mediation practice by attorneys.
223. Behavior ranges from trashing and bashing to therapeutic intervention. See Alfini, supra note
64, at 66-73 (explaining the mediation styles of "trashing," "bashing," and "hashing it out"); Susan S.
Silbey & Sally E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAW & POL'Y 7, 19-25 (1986) (describing
two types of mediation styles: bargaining and therapeutic). Additionally, mediators report ethical
dilemmas in resolving role conflicts. BUSH, supra note 96, at 8-26, reprinted in 1994 J. DiSP. RESOL.
at 9-40 (describing major types of dilemmas reported by practicing mediators).
224. The lack of certainty regarding the role of mediators may be reflective of a more fundamental,
definitional problem with mediation today. See generally Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, 45 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 149, 150 (1995) (reviewing KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE
(1994)).
Professor Leonard Riskin has proposed a system for classifying mediator orientations in order to
assist parties in selecting a mediator. It begins with two basic questions: "Does the mediator tend to
define problems narrowly or broadly?" and "[d]oes the mediator favor an evaluative or facilitative
role?" Leonard L. Riskin, Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COST LITIG. 111, 111 (1994). For a longer version of this article, see Leonard Riskin,
Understanding Mediators'Orientation, Strategies, and Techniques: A Guidefor the Perplexed, 1 HARV.
NEG. L. REV. (forthcoming 1996).
225. I refer here to a facilitator who is absolutely neutral as to process and outcome. See JOSEPH
B. STULBERG, TAKING CHARGEIMANAGING CONFLICT 143-45 (1987).
226. I refer here to Professor Bush's model mediator who helps parties experience the
transformative power of mediation. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 25, at 20-22; Bush, supra note
33, at 267-70.
227. I also note that determining the appropriate role of the court mediator has important
implications for mediation skills training. If the mediator is a super-negotiator for the parties, then
negotiation skills would obviously be emphasized. If the mediator is simply a director of the
communication process or upholder of the integrity of the mediation proceeding, then process
facilitation skills predominate. On the other hand, if the mediator is a predictor of probable court
outcome, then significant legal training would be required and it is likely that non-lawyers would
generally be precluded from mediating in court programs. For a "generic" approach to mediation skills
training, see Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley & Maria R. Volpe, Teaching Mediation as a Lawyering Role,
39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 571, 576-77 (1989).
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though existing professional and ethical standards distinguish between these
two forms of legal assistance,22 the distinction is not always clear in
practice. Moreover, such inquiries cannot be neatly bundled into these two
packages. Unrepresented litigants ask court mediators a wide variety of
legal questions ranging from simple procedural matters to complex
questions of law. Some questions can be answered quite easily by court
clerks, some require legal counsel, and still others have no clear answers.
Difficult policy questions remain.
The increased use of court mediation requires more guidance for
mediators who work with unrepresented parties. 9 Specifically, we need
further empirical research of the kinds of legal assistance requested by
unrepresented litigants in court mediation programs. This data can inform
our thinking about the situations in which legal assistance by the mediator
is or is not appropriate. As a beginning for this inquiry, I suggest four
categories of legal questions that commonly arise with unrepresented
litigants:"' administrative, informational, analytical, and strategic.
Questions in the administrative category relate to issues such as amending
a complaint, bringing a counter-claim, adding a third-party defendant,
executing a judgment, suing in civil court without an attorney, or
supporting specific claims with documentary proof. Information regarding
these matters is often found in brochures distributed by the court and is
regularly provided by court personnel." t Mediators should be permitted
228. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
229. This has already been recognized in connection with mandatory programs. "When parties are
unrepresented by counsel, special efforts should be made to make the parties aware of alternatives to
settlement and to avoid practices that make them feel that they must settle." See SPIDR REPORT, supra
note 66, at 18.
230. These categories are based on the experience of the Fordham Law School Mediation Clinic
in New York City's small claims courts. I do not intend this as a definitive list but simply as a place
to begin the discussion.
231. In New York, for example, the court provides a brochure that, among other things, instructs
parties on evidentiary matters:
Before trial, you should gather all the evidence necessary to prove your claim or your
defense. Anything that will help prove the facts in dispute should be brought to court. This
includes photographs, written agreements, an itemized bill or invoice that is receipted or
marked "paid", written estimates of the cost of service or repairs, a receipt for the purchase
of an item or the payment of a debt, cancelled checks and correspondence. If you rely on
estimates, two different written itemized estimates of the cost of repairs or service are
required. If possible, merchandise that is in dispute should be brought to court.
Testimony, including your own, is evidence. Any witness whose testimony is important
to your case may testify. This can be a person who witnessed your transaction or someone
whose special knowledge and experience makes him or her an expert on the cost of the
services or repairs that were provided or may be required.
NEw YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, A GUIDE TO SMALL CLAIMS COURT 5, 6 (1994).
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to respond to such inquiries.2"
The second category of questions, informational, relates to information
about specific areas of law. Examples from our clinic include inquiries
related to the statute of limitations, admissibility of evidence at trial,
enforceability of oral agreements, and availability of specific types of
damages. 3 Responding to these questions is problematic for the court
mediator because they raise a host of additional, interrelated questions.
How much information is enough? At what point does legal information
fall under the rubric of legal advice? Is it ever possible to provide
nonpartisan legal information without favoring one of the parties?
Mediators should exercise extreme caution in responding to these inquiries,
which, in my view, represent some of the most difficult questions in court
mediation practice today.234
Questions in the analytical category relate to ultimate issues and probable
court outcomes. 5 Am I liable under this contract? How would the judge
rule if this case were in court?.236 Is the defendant liable for any damages?
Answering questions in the analytical category goes beyond the boundaries
of legal information to the realm of specific legal advice. In my view, court
mediators should not engage in this practice with unrepresented parties.
Finally, there are questions related to strategy and tactics. Common
examples of such questions would be: What should I make for an opening
offer? Do you think I should take his offer or try to get more? Do you
think I am better off before a judge? Giving specific answers to these
questions requires the mediator to act in a representational capacity, a role
which is inconsistent with the nature of mediation.237
4. Courts' Responsibilities to Unrepresented Litigants
Courts have special responsibilities towards unrepresented parties to
ensure that their participation in the mediation process is informed23 and
232. The mediator should do so only if he or she is knowledgeable about the specific subject
matter.
233. Inquiries about the possibility of collecting damages for emotional distress are quite common.
234. I note here also that any response to these inquiries by non-lawyers may raise concerns with
the unauthorized practice of law doctrine.
235. In fact, some mediators evaluate cases and predict court outcomes. See Moberly, supra note
162, at 715; Riskin, supra note 224.
236. This is perhaps one of the most frequently asked questions.
237. But see Riskin, supra note 224 (discussing the role of evaluative mediators).
238. A significant effort in this direction is found in the CAL. R. CT., RECOMMENDED STANDARDS
OF JUDICIAL ADMiN. § 26(h)(1) (1995), which provides: "Balancing power in mediation should be a
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that the outcomes they reach are both informed and consensual. It is the
second aspect of informed consent that is most problematic because it
requires judgments about whether unrepresented parties had an understand-
ing of their legal rights before entering into agreements in mediation.239
Important questions must be addressed: Who should make such judgements
about informed consent? The mediator?24 Judges? Court employees?
Court-appointed lawyers? Can unrepresented parties waive an understanding
of their legal rights?24 A great deal of empirical research is required in
this area.
5. Fundamental Questions
In this article, I have suggested that recent experience with the practice
of mediation in the judicial system raises questions about what we can
realistically expect to achieve from court mediation. Certainly, the
mediation process allows litigants to acknowledge multiple human values
that may not be recognized in law.242 Empirical studies show high
settlement rates and suggest that both efficiency and individual satisfaction
can be achieved. However, a closer look at what actually happens in court
mediation tells a more unsettling story about the results of bargaining in
ignorance of the law-the story of hit-or-miss justice.
The "alegal character ' 243 of mediation exposes the inherent vulnerabili-
ty of persons who come to court without knowledge of the law. The worst-
case scenarios are unsettling: the possibility of unequal bargaining power;
dominance by the more powerful party or an overbearing mediator;244 and
continuing process and requires continuing mediator attention. An important means of empowering
parties to reach informed decisions is through the provision of careful and detailed descriptions of the
mediation process by the court, counsel, and mediator, and through premediation education.. . ." See
also ETHICAL STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN
DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 2 (1987) ("The neutral has an obligation to assure that all parties understand
the nature of the process, the procedures, the particular role of the neutral, and the parties' relationship
to the neutral.").
239. Much more empirical work needs to be done in this area.
240. I am sensitive to the burdens that would be imposed on mediators if they had to make
judgments about parties' legal rights.
241. I am exploring this question in a separate article.
242. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text
243. Riskin, supra note 30, at 34.
244. This may occur more frequently in the informal courts where some unsophisticated parties may
think that the mediator is a judge. One of my students who worked in the Bronx Small Claims Court
reported on some of the effects of this phenomena:
It was very easy to become judgmental and make all the decisions, especially when the
parties decided that you were ajudge despite all your introductions. It is very seductive tojust
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unknown relinquishment of legal rights.245 If all these contingencies
occur, parties may still leave court fully satisfied. Consider the case studies
discussed in this article. The claimants did not fully understand their legal
rights, but both left mediation seemingly satisfied. We can only speculate
about the results that might have occurred if they had been represented by
lawyers246 or had received legal assistance from the court.247 All of this
raises fundamental questions about the future direction of court mediation
programs. Should parties be represented by lawyers in court mediation?248
If one or both parties are not represented by lawyers, should mediation ever
tell people how to solve their problems and act like they have no choice, because many
people will believe you. You have to constantly remind yourself that your role is not to settle,
settle, settle, but to help people come to a decision or not, as they chose. Listening to my
classmates, I see that many mediators have this problem, though they may not see it as such.
245. Riskin, supra note 30, at 34-35.
246. In the Health Club case, a lawyer would probably have informed the claimant of the statutory
provision for treble damages in the Health Club Services Law. Economically, however, considering the
cost of paying an attorney for this legal advice, the claimant may have achieved close to the same result
as he did in mediation. In the Stolen Purse case, a lawyer might have helped the claimant persuade the
respondent that his sign disclaiming liability, although indicative of his genuine attempts to wam his
patrons, would not necessarily protect him from liability.
For a discussion of the benefits of legal representation in mandatory divorce mediation, see McEwen
et al., supra note 219.
247. As noted earlier in this article, the place of legal advice in mediation is a subject on which
scholars and practitioners differ widely. See supra notes 148-61 and accompanying text. Discussions
of legal advice also raise concerns about the unauthorized practice of law doctrine. See articles cited
supra note 173.
248. If so, then this also calls for a greater understanding of the role of the lawyer representing a
client in court mediation. THE NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION provide
some guidance for this understanding. Rule 10.3 states: "Courts and mediators should work with the
bar to educate lawyers about: (a) the difference in the lawyer's role in mediation as compared with
traditional representation; and (b) the advantages and disadvantages of active participation by the parties
and lawyers in mediation sessions." NATIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 59, rule 10.3. See also Ronald
J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers
in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509 (1994); David Plimpton, Mediation of Disputes: The Role of the
Lawyer and How Best to Serve the Clients' Interest, 8 ME. B.J. 38 (1993). In McEwen's study of
lawyers in divorce mediation in Maine, the lawyers viewed themselves as "rights-oriented advocate[s],
advising and protecting their clients during the mediation process." Craig McEwen et al., Lawyers,
Mediation, and the Management of Divorce Practice, 28 LAw & SOC'y REV. 149, 163 (1994). See also
Jennifer A. Mastrofski, Reexamination of the Bar: Incentives to Support Custody Mediation, 9
MEDIATION Q. 21 (1991) (discussing the role of attorneys in custody mediation).
There is no magic, however, to the presence of a lawyer in mediation. Without an understanding of
the mediation process, lawyers may actually deprive parties of the benefits of working toward
settlement-the freedom to talk without being bound by rules of evidence and procedure, reconciliation,
telling a story, and being heard. We need more studies of the behavior of lawyers who act as advocates
in mediation and more training for lawyers on how to represent parties in mediation.
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be mandated?249 In short, who should be allowed to mediate in court?25.
Full examination of these questions may lead to the conclusion that, in
order for parties to achieve the equivalent of justice through law, we must
observe greater fidelity to the original understanding of mediation as a
voluntary process among parties with relatively equal bargaining pow-
er.25' Such a finding might signal the end of all mandatory court media-
tion programs for unrepresented parties. 2 I do not make this suggestion
lightly. It is becoming increasingly apparent to me that settlement is too
often the unitary goal of court mediation programs. Given the pressure
techniques used by some court mediators253 and the high number of
reported settlement rates,2 4 I believe that there are serious fairness
concerns for the litigants who originally came to court seeking justice
through law; many of them will settle in mediation and experience instead
hit-or-miss justice. Those who are knowledgeable about their legal rights
will receive a "hit," while the others will miss out. Thus, until there is a
249. SPIDR. has established the following criteria that should be met before mandatory dispute
resolution is imposed:
1. The funding for mandatory dispute resolution programs is provided on a basis
comparable to funding for trials.
2. Coercion to settle in the form of reports to the trier of fact and of financial disincentives
to trial is not used in connection with mandated mediation....
3. Mandatory participation is used only when a high quality program (i) is readily
accessible, (ii) permits party participation, (iii) permits lawyer participation when the parties
wish it, and (iv) provides clarity about the precise procedures that are being required.
SPIDR REPORT, supra note 66, at 2-3. See also Andreas Nelle, Making Mediation Mandatory: A
Proposed Framework, 7 J. DISPUTE RESOL. 287 (1992).
250. These questions acquire increased significance in the courts of the informal justice system
(e.g., housing court, small claims court, and to some extent family court) where parties are not generally
represented by lawyers.
251. However, if the results of a recent ABA Joumal-Gallup poll represent the sentiments of the
majority of Americans, it may be that mandatory mediation is here to stay. DeBenedictis, supra note
75, at 52.
252. Some efforts have been made to assist unrepresented parties in court mediation. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 440.25(3) (West 1991 & Supp. 1994) (providing that the employer's lawyer may not
attend a mediation conference unless employee's lawyer is also present); RULES AND PROCEDURES FOR
THE OaA. DisP. REsOL. ACT rule 10 (providing for an "assisting party" to advise client). In other
mediation contexts, nonlawyers have been permitted to represent parties in mediation. See, e.g., CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 56500.3(b) (West Supp. 1995) (special education); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186-C:24
(Supp. 1994) (same). See also IOWA RULES GOVERNING STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYER
MEDIATORS IN FAMiLY DISPUTES rule 6 (providing that a mediator must advise the parties to obtain
independent legal counsel, and if the parties decide to proceed without such counsel, the mediator must
provide a written statement to the parties informing them, among other things, that they may be giving
up legal rights in mediation).
253. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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clearer consensus on goals other than efficiency, such as process and
outcome fairness, we should question the imposition of court mediation on
unrepresented parties with potentially unequal bargaining power.25
V. CONCLUSION
Court mediation can help litigants express human values that may be
overlooked in law. This does not mean, however, that law should be
overlooked.256 Court mediation offers litigants a forum for private,
individualized, and efficient justice, but its private and individualistic nature
calls for public attention and critical evaluation in order to prevent good
intentions from running amok. What is at stake is public trust in the legal
system. As courts jump on the ADR bandwagon, encouraging, directing,
and mandating participation in settlement processes such as mediation, there
is serious danger that court mediation programs will parallel the official
legal system without the benefits of that system; namely, the protections
available in justice through law.25 7
Thus, court mediation's promise of individualized justice requires greater
scrutiny. It is time to confront the limits of this promise. Specifically, we
must pay careful attention to what happens to unrepresented parties, a
growing population in the court system. The camouflage and disguises of
the mediation process-buzzwords such as self-determination and
autonomy-are powerful traps for them. Unaware of their legal rights,
unrepresented parties may unwittingly surrender them and still profess great
satisfaction with the court mediation process.5 8 This kind of ignorance
has no place in court ADR programs.259 Otherwise, justice in court
mediation continues to remain serendipitous.
Confronting the limits of court mediation means that in our desire to
promote mediation as an enlightened vision of disputing, we must be
255. I am more sanguine about the prospect of voluntary court mediation with unrepresented parties.
Cf. McEwen et al., supra note 219, at 1392 (arguing that the best alternative may be to allowpro se
parties to "opt out" of mandatory mediation).
256. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
257. Due process, full hearing, and appellate review, for example.
258. See supra note 36.
259. Worse still, unrepresented parties will have little recourse after they settle their cases in court
mediation. How would they "discover" that they had been had? How would an unrepresented defendant
in court mediation learn that the plaintiffs claim was barred by the statute of limitations? Or, how
would an unrepresented tenant learn that the landlord's rental to her was in violation of the housing
code? In both of these cases, how would the unrepresented parties go about setting aside the mediation
agreement made in ignorance of these factors?
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careful not to devalue the parties' reasonable expectations for securing
justice through law. Court mediation is a subculture operating officially
within the main legal culture. The fundamental question it presents is one
of fairness: Will those whose cases are shunted from the courtroom to the
mediation room260 receive a fair shake? I believe they will if their
bargaining is informed by law.26' If not, court mediation is an impover-
ished alternative to judicial adjudication that demeans both the courts and
the mediation process.
260. I use the word "room" loosely. The setting for court mediation ranges from the informality
of crowded, noisy hallways to the dignity of a separate room.
261. See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF ETHICAL RULES AND STANDARDS ON
REFERRAL FOR INDEPENDENT LEGAL ADVICE
ARIZONA: STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS 2 (proposed draft
approved by the Arizona Dispute Resolution Association, Credentials
Committee, June 1995):
Independent Advice and Information. The mediator shall encourage
participants to obtain independent legal advice and independent legal review
of any mediated agreement as is reasonably necessary for the parties to reach
an informed agreement.
COLORADO: CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (adopted by Colorado
Council of Mediation Organizations, January 1982), reprinted in CHRISTO-
PHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR
RESOLVING CONFLICT 299, 303 (1986):
Mediators shall refer parties to appropriate attorneys for legal advice.
FLORIDA: FLA. R. FOR CERTIFIED AND COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS
RULE 10.090(b), reprinted in Proposed Standards of Professional Conduct,
604 So.2d 764, 768 (Fla. 1992):
Independent Legal Advice. When a mediator believes a party does not
understand or appreciate how an agreement may adversely affect legal rights
or obligations, the mediator shall advise the participants to seek independent
legal counsel.
HAWAII: STANDARDS FOR PRIVATE AND PUBLIC MEDIATORS IN THE
STATE OF HAWAII (adopted by the Hawaii Supreme Court, April 22, 1986),
reprinted in Robert Coulson, BUSINESS MEDIATION-WHAT YOU NEED TO
KNOW 83, 85, 90 (1987).
II. (3) Where a mediator concludes that the parties are not informed of their
rights, the mediator has a duty to encourage the parties to seek qualified
legal,.. . or other professional advice before or during the mediation process.
VII. (1) Professional Advice
A mediator shall encourage and assist the participants to obtain independent
expert information and advice when such is needed to reach an informed
agreement or to protect the rights of a participant. A mediator may give
information only in those areas where qualified by training or experience and
only with the caution that disputants are encouraged to seek independent
advice and counsel on the matters at hand.
INDIANA: IND. R. FOR ALT. DISP. RESOL. 2.7(A)(5):
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The mediator shall advise each of the parties to consider independent legal
advice.
NEBRASKA: NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2913(6) (Supp. 1994):
The mediator shall be aware of and recommend outside resources to the
parties whenever appropriate. The mediator shall advise participants to obtain
legal review of agreements as necessary.
OKLAHOMA: CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, RULES
AND PROCEDURES FOR THE OKLA. DISP. RESOL. ACT app. A:
The mediator shall allow parties to independently assess their legal position
and/or seek the assessment of an attorney.
